Overall Trends
Total, fatal, and serious accidents in the selected range.
Search investigations, review source evidence, monitor watched reports, and trace long-term patterns from one calm, data-first workspace.
Fast key and full-text search with live filters, watches, and precise metadata.
Use quotes for exact phrase matches (for example "fuel selector valve").
Track fatal and non-fatal accident patterns across Part 91, Part 135, and Part 121 operations.
Major cases, deep-report coverage, and investigation media across decades of NTSB history.
Move quickly by aircraft, airport, operator, and time with indexes built for research, not wandering.
NTSB Reports is an independent research and search tool for public aviation accident and incident records. It brings NTSB aviation reports, structured fields, docket files, extracted figures, photos, videos, and update history into one searchable interface.
The goal is practical safety education: make it faster to find relevant investigations, compare similar events, review factual records, and understand the evidence behind probable-cause and preliminary reports.
The investigative work and source records belong to the National Transportation Safety Board and the published investigation record. This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the NTSB.
Houston, TX
TWO MECHANICS WERE REPOSITIONING A BOEING 737-200, N11244, TO CONTINENTAL DEPARTURE GATE 41. THE LEFT SEAT MECHANIC DID NOT UTILIZE THE MECHANIC TAXI CHECKLIST. THIS MECHANIC SUBSEQUENTLY REPORTED DIFFICULTY IN NOSE WHEEL STEERING AND BRAKING. THE RIGHT SEAT MECHANIC OFFERED TO CALL MAINTENANCE; HOWEVER, THE OTHER MECHANIC DECLINED THE OFFER. AT THE TIME, FLIGHT 1176, A BOEING 737-300, N14336, FROM GATE 44 WAS UNDER CONTROL OF THE PUSHBACK TEAM. THE CREW OF THE PUSHBACK AIRPLANE AND WITNESSES REPORTED THE REPOSITIONING AIRPLANE ENGINES WERE AT 'A VERY HIGH POWER SETTING' AND 'TAXIING AT A HIGH RATE OF SPEED.' THE RIGHT WING OF AIRPLANE N11244 WAS SUBSTANTIALLY DAMAGED WHEN IT HIT THE LEFT OUTBOARD FLAP AREA OF N14336. THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS FOR THE NOSE WHEEL STEERING, THE MAIN WHEEL STEERING, THE MAIN WHEEL BRAKES, AND THE THRUST REVERSERS WERE FUNCTIONALLY TESTED AND FOUND OPERATIONAL.
THE FAILURE OF MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL TO FOLLOW THE TAXI CHECKLIST RESULTING IN THE HYDRAULIC PUMPS NOT BEING TURNED ON.
On November 26, 1994, at 1102 central standard time, a Boeing 737-300, N14336, Continental Airlines Flight 1176, received minor damage during a ground collision at the Intercontinental Airport, Houston, Texas. The crew of 6 and 128 passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the scheduled Title 14 CFR Part 121 flight to Chicago, Illinois. Two mechanics were repositioning a Boeing 737-200, N11244, to Continental departure gate 41. Simultaneously, Flight 1176, a Boeing 737-300, from gate 44 was under the control of the pushback team consisting of a tug driver and a wingwalker. The right wing of N11244 contacted the left outboard flap, cockpit crew, in the process of starting engine #1, felt the impact, aborted the engine start, and looked aft from the cockpit window. The passengers were deplaned out of the right forward door utilizing portable stairs. During interviews, conducted by the investigator-in-charge and the operator, with the left seat (lead) mechanic, the following information was revealed. The mechanic taxi checklist was not utilized. He was unable to verify by discussion the "ON" position of the cockpit hydraulic pump switches for the Boeing 737-200 versus the 737-300, which are not in the same sequence in the cockpit. He reported difficulty in nose wheel steering and braking with N11244. During interviews, conducted by the investigator-in-charge and the operator, with the right seat mechanic, the following information was revealed. He offered to call maintenance following an indication by the left seat mechanic of a nose wheel steering problem; however, that mechanic declined the offer. On the enclosed statements the crew and witnesses stated that the repositioning aircraft engines were at "a very high power setting" and "taxing at a high rate of speed." The hydraulic systems (enclosed report) for the nose wheel steering, the main wheel steering, the main wheel brakes, and the thrust reversers were functionally tested. It was determined by the test that 5 brake applications were available from the accumulator of the "A" hydraulic system and that 6 brake applications were available from the accumulator of the "B" hydraulic system. The nose wheel steering, the thrust reversers, and the main landing gear brakes functioned. Toxicological findings, initiated by the operator, for the mechanics and ground crew were negative.