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0Wasso, OK
THE PILOT ELECTED TO ABORT THE TAKEOFF AFTER THE AIRPLANE BECAME AIRBORNE AFTER EXECUTING A SHORT FIELD TAKEOFF PROCEDURE FROM A 2,400 FOOT GRASS AIRSTRIP. THE AIRCRAFT, WITH 4 ADULTS AND ONE TODDLER ABOARD, WAS A COUPLE OF FEET ABOVE THE GROUND AS THE PILOT ATTEMPTED TO ACCELERATE. THE PILOT CLOSED THE THROTTLE TO ABORT THE TAKEOFF WHEN THE AIRPLANE HAD USED APPROXIMATELY 2/3 OF THE RUNWAY. THE AIRPLANE TOUCHED DOWN NEAR THE END OF THE RUNWAY, AND THE PILOT ATTEMPTED TO STOP THE AIRPLANE BY APPLYING THE BRAKES. BRAKING ACTION ON THE GRASS SURFACE DID NOT SLOW THE AIRPLANE DOWN, AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE AIRPLANE OVERRAN THE RUNWAY, WENT THROUGH A BARBED WIRE FENCE, AND IMPACTED FENCE POSTS. DENSITY ALTITUDE WAS 2,600 FEET AND THE WINDS WERE CALM.
THE PILOT'S DELAYED DECISION TO ABORT THE TAKEOFF. THE PILOT'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY CALCULATE THE PERFORMANCE DATA PRIOR TO TAKEOFF WAS A FACTOR.
On August 5, 1995, at 1930 central daylight time, a Grumman American AA-5B, N4546J, was substantially damaged during a runway overrun during takeoff from the Ragtime Aerodrome, near Owasso, Oklahoma. The private pilot, his three adult passengers, and a 2 year old child, were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the Title 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The intended destination was the Richard Jones Airport, near Tulsa, Oklahoma. A weather briefing was not received and a flight plan was not filed for the flight. In the enclosed pilot/operator report, the pilot stated that he had completed similar flights in the same aircraft, with a similar load configuration. The pilot further stated that because of the length of the field, he utilized the a short field takeoff technique. He added that the airplane became airborne "without a stall warning" about 1/3 the distance of the runway; however, he stated that the airplane "did feel heavy at this time." According to the pilot, he kept the airplane within a couple of feet off the ground to allow the aircraft to accelerate. At approximately 2/3 the distance of the 2,400 foot runway the pilot elected to abort the takeoff, and the airplane touched down within a few feet after the throttle was closed. The pilot added that full braking was applied as soon as the airplane touched down. Braking action on the grass surface did not slow the airplane down, and subsequently the airplane overran the runway, went through a barbed wire fence, and impacted fence posts. Weight and balance calculations were performed using figures provided by the pilot/operator. The airplane was found to be within weight and balance limits at the time of the accident. Density altitude at the time of the accident was calculated at 2,600 feet. Winds at the accident site were reported as calm. In the enclosed statement, the pilot stated "there was essentially no wind." In the enclosed pilot/operator report, the pilot offered "awaiting for better atmospheric conditions" or "ferry passengers via multiple trips to decrease load" as options that could have prevented this accidents.