Overall Trends
Total, fatal, and serious accidents in the selected range.
Search investigations, review source evidence, monitor watched reports, and trace long-term patterns from one calm, data-first workspace.
Fast key and full-text search with live filters, watches, and precise metadata.
Use quotes for exact phrase matches (for example "fuel selector valve").
Track fatal and non-fatal accident patterns across Part 91, Part 135, and Part 121 operations.
Major cases, deep-report coverage, and investigation media across decades of NTSB history.
Move quickly by aircraft, airport, operator, and time with indexes built for research, not wandering.
NTSB Reports is an independent research and search tool for public aviation accident and incident records. It brings NTSB aviation reports, structured fields, docket files, extracted figures, photos, videos, and update history into one searchable interface.
The goal is practical safety education: make it faster to find relevant investigations, compare similar events, review factual records, and understand the evidence behind probable-cause and preliminary reports.
The investigative work and source records belong to the National Transportation Safety Board and the published investigation record. This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the NTSB.
Nashville, TN
After takeoff, pilots (plts) had difficulty retracting landing gear (LG), and manually bypassed LG anti-retraction system to retract gear. While climbing, they realized cabin pressurization (CP) and takeoff warning (TW) systems were still in ground mode. There was evidence the nosegear shock strut was underserviced/underinflated for cold/winter weather operation; and the strut did not extend sufficiently to actuate the ground shift mechanism, to release the landing gear lever anti-retraction mechanism, and to shift aircraft (acft) systems to flight mode. Using quick reference handbook (QRH) procedures, plts pulled Ground Control Relay circuit breakers (C/Bs), then noted CP and TW began operating in flight (flt) mode. En route, the flt was uneventful. Plts decided to reset C/Bs just before touchdown. They made a normal approach to runway, and on short final approach, Captain reset C/Bs. At that time, ground spoilers activated, and acft descended rapidly, striking ground tail first in runway approach light area. Abnormal procedure in QRH stated 'GROUND CONTROL RELAY C/Bs (if pulled) . . . RESET . . . .' This was listed in 'Approach and Landing' section of procedure. Acft operating manual (AOM) stated 'Reset Ground Control Relay circuit breakers during taxi . . . .' Plts stated they had not referenced AOM, nor did they notify company of in-flight irregularity. (See: NTSB/AAR-96/07 for detailed info)
the flight crew's improper procedures and actions (failing to contact system operations/dispatch, failing to use all available aircraft and company manuals, and prematurely resetting the ground control relay circuit breakers) in response to an in-flight abnormality, which resulted in the inadvertent in-flight activation of the ground spoilers during the approach to landing and the airplane's subsequent descent rate and excessively hard ground impact in the runway approach light area. Contributing factors in the accident were ValuJet's failure to incorporate cold weather nosegear servicing procedures in its operations and maintenance manuals, the incomplete procedural guidance contained in the ValuJet quick reference handbook, and the flight crew's inadequate knowledge and understanding of the aircraft systems.
For detailed information concerning this case, see the National Transportation Safety Board Blue Cover Report (NTSB/AAR-96/07).