On March 4, 1997, about 1300 eastern standard time, a Beech E35, N3257C, registered to a private owner, operating as a Title 14 CFR Part 91, personal flight, crashed during a forced landing near Nashville, Georgia. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The airplane was substantially damaged. The private pilot received minor injuries and the commercial pilot was seriously injured. The flight had departed Flagler Beach, Florida, about 1150, en route to St. Louis, Missouri. About 45 minutes after takeoff, at a cruise altitude of 8,500 feet, the pilot-in-command (PIC) attempted to change fuel tanks, and according to his statement, "the selector would not move." The pilot in the right seat attempted to change tanks and he also was unable to move the fuel selector. The PIC elected to land as soon as possible to have the problem corrected. The flight descended and entered a left downwind for runway 27 at Berrien County Airport. Before turning to final the PIC checked all the gauges and found them in the "green." On short final he "heard the engine spit once and die." He told the other pilot that we had "lost our engine." The right seat pilot pumped the "wobble pump" while he flew the airplane, in an attempt to restart the engine, but they could not get the engine to "restart." The left wing struck a tree, and separated from the airplane. The right wing lifted up and the airplane went nose first into a swamp. The pilot had called the FBO (fixed base operator) on the airport's UNICOM frequency, about 15 minutes before landing and stated that he needed fuel. The next time the FBO heard from the pilot of N3257C, he reported on the radio that he had crashed about 400 yards short of runway 27. The FAA interviewed the PIC and asked him when he last moved the fuel selector valve. He stated that the selector valve was last moved "the day before the flight and operated normally at that time." He was then asked if the fuel selector was moved before he departed for this flight on March 4th. The pilot told the FAA that he had "not," because for this flight he had used an "abbreviated checklist." Item 12 in the airplane's Flight Manual, under the heading of starting procedures, stated; "...Activate the [fuel] selector valve several times by rotating the handle from tank to tank to ensure that the selector valve is free." The abbreviated checklist that the PIC used did not contain item 12. Examination of the airplane's fuel selector was performed under the supervision of the FAA, and revealed that the selector valve was stuck in the left fuel tank position and could not be moved. According to the FAA inspector's statement, the disassembly revealed that "particulate matter," appearing to be "rust" from the fuel/drain spring, had worked its way in between the valve seat, causing the valve to be "stuck in place." The left fuel tank had been breached during the accident sequence, and the amount of fuel in tank at the time of the accident was not determined.