Overall Trends
Total, fatal, and serious accidents in the selected range.
Search investigations, review source evidence, monitor watched reports, and trace long-term patterns from one calm, data-first workspace.
Fast key and full-text search with live filters, watches, and precise metadata.
Use quotes for exact phrase matches (for example "fuel selector valve").
Track fatal and non-fatal accident patterns across Part 91, Part 135, and Part 121 operations.
Major cases, deep-report coverage, and investigation media across decades of NTSB history.
Move quickly by aircraft, airport, operator, and time with indexes built for research, not wandering.
NTSB Reports is an independent research and search tool for public aviation accident and incident records. It brings NTSB aviation reports, structured fields, docket files, extracted figures, photos, videos, and update history into one searchable interface.
The goal is practical safety education: make it faster to find relevant investigations, compare similar events, review factual records, and understand the evidence behind probable-cause and preliminary reports.
The investigative work and source records belong to the National Transportation Safety Board and the published investigation record. This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the NTSB.
Darrington, WA
While in a hover during heavy-lift aero-logging operations, the vertical fin separated from the tail boom, resulting in an uncontrolled descent into the terrain. During the investigation, the NTSB Materials Laboratory determined that the separation was due to the propagation of a number of fatigue cracks which had initiated within the fourth rivet hole above where the left side of the spar fin cap protruded from the tail boom. Although the FAA had previously issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) 97-20-09 to address the separation of vertical fins from UH-1 helicopters used in repeated heavy-lift operations, the Rotorcraft Directorate determined that the AD was not adequate. As a result, the Directorate initiated the formulation of a Priority Letter Airworthiness Directive requiring the replacement of the original fin spar with one that '...has been shown to account for the effects of repeated heavy-lift operations.'
The total separation of the vertical fin (stabilizer), as the result of fatigue cracks which initiated in the fourth rivet hole above where the fin extends from the tailboom.
On December 14, 1998, approximately 1100 Pacific standard time, a Garlick UH-1H helicopter, N94NW, owned by Northwest Helicopters, and operated as a 14 CFR Part 133 aero-logging operation, impacted the terrain after experiencing a separation of the vertical fin in flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The aircraft sustained substantial damage, and the commercial pilot received serious injuries. The flight originated at a nearby helicopter service pad. According to the pilot, he was in a hover at the end of a 150 foot long-line that had just been attached to a set of logs. He reported that he had not yet began to lift the logs, but had taken the slack out of the line when he heard a loud bang. The aircraft immediately began spinning to the right and settled into the terrain. The aft portion of the tail boom was sent to the NTSB materials laboratory for examination. That examination revealed the presence of fatigue cracking in all five layers of the left side of the vertical fin spar cap. According to the laboratory, the cracks initiated from the hole for the fourth rivet above where the fin protrudes from the tail boom, and propagated through most of the left side of the spar cap prior to final separation. During the investigation, it was determined that the vertical fins of at least two other UH-1 helicopters had previously separated in flight, although not through the fourth hole. The FAA had previously issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) number 97-20-09 to address the problem of fin separation from UH-1 helicopters used in repeated heavy-lift operation, but the FAA Rotorcraft Directorate subsequently determined that the AD was not adequate. As a result, the Directorate initiated the formulation of a Priority Letter Airworthiness Directive calling for the replacement of the original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) fin spar with one that "...has been proven to account for the effects of repeated heavy-lift operations."