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Jacksonville, FL
38 MI FROM THE DESTINATION ARPT, THE CAPT NOTIFIED THE F/A TO BE SEATED DUE TO POSSIBLE TURBULENCE ENCOUNTER. AFTER COMPLETING THE APPROACH CHECKLIST, THE F/A WAS GIVEN THE SIGNAL TO PERFORM THE FINAL CABIN CHECK. 9 MI FROM THE ARPT, THE FLIGHT ENCOUNTERED 'A SINGLE STRONG WINDSHEAR' WHICH CAUSED THE F/A TO BE THROWN AGAINST THE CEILING & THEN TO THE FLOOR. AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURENCE, THE AIRPLANE WAS OPERATING WITHIN A WEAK LEVEL I WX RADAR RETURN, WITHIN 6 MI OF A LEVEL II RETURN, AND WITHIN 9 MI OF A VERY STRONG LEVEL IV RETURN. THE OPERATOR'S FLT OPS MANUAL STATES THAT THE CAPT WILL ADVISE THE F/A AS TO WHETHER OR NOT HE/SHE SHOULD BE SEATED WITH THE SEAT BELT FASTENED. IN ADDITION, NEITHER THE FLT OPS MANUAL NOR THE F/A MANUAL GAVE ANY INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHEN THE F/A SHOULD RESUME HIS/HER DUTIES AFTER BEING TOLD TO BE SEATED, NOR WAS THE CAPT INSTRUCTED TO NOTIFY THE F/A TO RESUME HIS/HER DUTIES.
THE OPERATOR'S LACK OF ADEQUATE INSTRUCTIONS TO CREWMEMBERS AS TO WHEN FLIGHT ATTENDANTS CAN RESUME CABIN DUTIES AFTER BEING TOLD TO BE SEATED BY THE CAPTAIN.
38 MI FROM THE DESTINATION ARPT, THE CAPT NOTIFIED THE F/A TO BE SEATED DUE TO POSSIBLE TURBULENCE ENCOUNTER. AFTER COMPLETING THE APPROACH CHECKLIST, THE F/A WAS GIVEN THE SIGNAL TO PERFORM THE FINAL CABIN CHECK. 9 MI FROM THE ARPT, THE FLIGHT ENCOUNTERED 'A SINGLE STRONG WINDSHEAR' WHICH CAUSED THE F/A TO BE THROWN AGAINST THE CEILING & THEN TO THE FLOOR. AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURENCE, THE AIRPLANE WAS OPERATING WITHIN A WEAK LEVEL I WX RADAR RETURN, WITHIN 6 MI OF A LEVEL II RETURN, AND WITHIN 9 MI OF A VERY STRONG LEVEL IV RETURN. THE OPERATOR'S FLT OPS MANUAL STATES THAT THE CAPT WILL ADVISE THE F/A AS TO WHETHER OR NOT HE/SHE SHOULD BE SEATED WITH THE SEAT BELT FASTENED. IN ADDITION, NEITHER THE FLT OPS MANUAL NOR THE F/A MANUAL GAVE ANY INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHEN THE F/A SHOULD RESUME HIS/HER DUTIES AFTER BEING TOLD TO BE SEATED, NOR WAS THE CAPT INSTRUCTED TO NOTIFY THE F/A TO RESUME HIS/HER DUTIES.