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Charlotte, NC
THE FLIGHT WAS ON THE TAKEOFF ROLL FOR RUNWAY 18L, WITH THE CAPTAIN AT THE CONTROLS. THE FLT CREW REPORTED AN AIRSPEED STAGNATION, FOLLOWED BY A NOTICEABLE DECELERATION, AFTER THE 'V1' CALLOUT. THE CAPTAIN REJECTED THE TAKEOFF, HOWEVER, THE AIRCRAFT OVERRAN THE RUNWAY. THE CREW REPORTED THAT THE AIRCRAFT NEVER REACHED V1, SINCE USAIR PROCEDURES STATE THAT THE PILOT NOT FLYING WILL INITIATE THE V1 CALL 5 KNOTS PRIOR TO COMPUTED V1. ROTATION SPEED (VR) WAS EQUAL TO V1 FOR THE TAKEOFF CONDITIONS. A READOUT OF THE CVR INDICATED THAT THE F/O CALLED 'V1', THEN 'R' (ROTATE) PRIOR TO THE ABORT. DFDR READOUT SHOWED THAT THERE WAS A SMALL DROP IN AIRSPEED (1.92 KNOTS) AT 128.63 KNOTS, HOWEVER, THE AIRSPEED SUBSEQUENTLY CLIMBED TO 137.8 KNOTS. COMPUTED V1/VR WAS 132 KTS, V2 WAS 137 KTS. THE FLT CREW STATED THAT THE AIRCRAFT DID NOT ROTATE, HOWEVER WITNESSES (INCLUDING A TOWER CONTROLLER) REPORTED THAT THE AIRCRAFT DID ROTATE PRIOR TO THE ABORT. AN EXAMINATION OF THE AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FAILED TO EXPLAIN THE REPORTED DECELERATION.
THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND'S DECISION TO REJECT THE TAKEOFF AT A SPEED IN EXCESS OF V1, RESULTING IN AN INADEQUATE DISTANCE TO STOP THE AIRCRAFT.
THE FLIGHT WAS ON THE TAKEOFF ROLL FOR RUNWAY 18L, WITH THE CAPTAIN AT THE CONTROLS. THE FLT CREW REPORTED AN AIRSPEED STAGNATION, FOLLOWED BY A NOTICEABLE DECELERATION, AFTER THE 'V1' CALLOUT. THE CAPTAIN REJECTED THE TAKEOFF, HOWEVER, THE AIRCRAFT OVERRAN THE RUNWAY. THE CREW REPORTED THAT THE AIRCRAFT NEVER REACHED V1, SINCE USAIR PROCEDURES STATE THAT THE PILOT NOT FLYING WILL INITIATE THE V1 CALL 5 KNOTS PRIOR TO COMPUTED V1. ROTATION SPEED (VR) WAS EQUAL TO V1 FOR THE TAKEOFF CONDITIONS. A READOUT OF THE CVR INDICATED THAT THE F/O CALLED 'V1', THEN 'R' (ROTATE) PRIOR TO THE ABORT. DFDR READOUT SHOWED THAT THERE WAS A SMALL DROP IN AIRSPEED (1.92 KNOTS) AT 128.63 KNOTS, HOWEVER, THE AIRSPEED SUBSEQUENTLY CLIMBED TO 137.8 KNOTS. COMPUTED V1/VR WAS 132 KTS, V2 WAS 137 KTS. THE FLT CREW STATED THAT THE AIRCRAFT DID NOT ROTATE, HOWEVER WITNESSES (INCLUDING A TOWER CONTROLLER) REPORTED THAT THE AIRCRAFT DID ROTATE PRIOR TO THE ABORT. AN EXAMINATION OF THE AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FAILED TO EXPLAIN THE REPORTED DECELERATION.