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Aviation safety reports, made easier to study

NTSB Reports is an independent research and search tool for public aviation accident and incident records. It brings NTSB aviation reports, structured fields, docket files, extracted figures, photos, videos, and update history into one searchable interface.

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NTSB Report

May 31, 1992 · Schempp-Hirth Ventus A/16.6 Ventus A/1 · N8KS

Tucson, AZ

Overview

Report Status
Probable Cause
Event Type
Accident
Date
May 31, 1992
Injury Outcomes
1 injury (1 serious injury)
Location
Tucson, AZ
Aircraft
Schempp-Hirth Ventus A/16.6 Ventus A/1
Tail Number
N8KS
Operator
Roy S Cundiff
Injuries
Serious
Aircraft Damage
Destroyed
NTSB Number
LAX92LA225

After 4.2 hours of flight while cruising at 8,000 ft, the right aileron control system 'Otellier fitting disconnected. The pilot said that the aileron trail position in the airstream caused the glider to enter a spiral dive to the right which could not be stopped by left aileron or rudder. The pilot bailed out about 1,000 ft AGL. The glider was assembled on 5/30/92 in accordance with the flight and maintenance manual. The glider was then flown for 4.6 hours and parked overnight. The pilot said he lubed the male ball fitting prior to assembly as instructed in the manual and cleaned and lubed the slide lock plate with WD-40. The fitting manufacturer's safety maintenance information (not available to pilots) requires the ball and socket fittings to be lubed at each assembly, but cautions against allowing lubricants on the slide lock plate because the slide 'may lose its nonreversibility' and cause the fitting to disconnect. The glider maintenance and flight manual does not caution against lubricants on the slide lock plate.

NTSB Probable Cause

THE INFLIGHT DISCONNECTION OF THE RIGHT AILERON 'OTELLIER COUPLER FITTING DUE TO LUBRICANTS ON THE COUPLER SLIDE LOCK PLATE, AND THE FAILURE OF THE GLIDER MANUFACTURER TO INCLUDE APPROPRIATE PRECAUTIONARY INFORMATION IN THE MAINTENANCE AND/OR FLIGHT MANUAL. FACTORS IN THE ACCIDENT WERE: THE FAILURE OF THE GLIDER AND FITTING MANUFACTURERS TO MANDATE FAIL/SAFE DEVICES FOR THE COUPLER FITTING, AND THE DESIGN OF THE GLIDER REGARDING THE FACILITATION OF THE COUPLER CONNECTIONS DURING THE GLIDER ASSEMBLY PROCESS.

Full Narrative

AFTER 4.2 HOURS OF FLIGHT WHILE CRUISING AT 8,000 FT, THE RIGHT AILERON CONTROL SYSTEM 'OTELLIER FITTING DISCONNECTED. THE PILOT SAID THAT THE AILERON TRAIL POSITION IN THE AIRSTREAM CAUSED THE GLIDER TO ENTER A SPIRAL DIVE TO THE RIGHT WHICH COULD NOT BE STOPPED BY LEFT AILERON OR RUDDER. THE PILOT BAILED OUT ABOUT 1,000 FT AGL. THE GLIDER WAS ASSEMBLED ON 5/30/92 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLT & MAINT MANUAL. THE GLIDER WAS THEN FLOWN FOR 4.6 HRS & PARKED OVERNIGHT. THE PILOT SAID HE LUBED THE MALE BALL FITTING PRIOR TO ASSEMBLY AS INSTRUCTED IN THE MANUAL & CLEANED & LUBED THE SLIDE LOCK PLATE WITH WD-40. THE FITTING MANUFACTURERS SAFETY MAINT INFO (NOT AVAILABLE TO PILOTS) REQUIRES THE BALL & SOCKET FITTINGS TO BE LUBED AT EACH ASSEMLBY, BUT CAUTION AGAINST ALLOWING LUBRICANTS ON THE SLIDE LOCK PLATE BECAUSE THE SLIDE 'MAY LOOSE ITS NONREVERSIBILITY' & CAUSE THE FITTING TO DISCONNECT. THE GLIDER MAINT AND FLT MANUAL DOES NOT CAUTION AGAINST LUBRICANTS ON THE SLIDE LOCK PLATE.

Flight

Event TypeAccident
Event Time16:00 MST
Nearest Airport0nm N
Runway0
Flight Plan FiledNone
Aircraft FireNo
Aircraft ExplosionNo

Aircraft

AircraftSchempp-Hirth Ventus A/16.6 Ventus A/1
Tail NumberN8KS
Aircraft CategoryGli
DamageDestroyed
OperatorRoy S Cundiff
Operating RulePart 91
Engines0
Engine TypeUnknown
Engine DetailsUnknown
Seats1

People & Injuries

Injury Summary1 injury (1 serious injury)
Fatal0
Serious1
Minor0
Uninjured0
Total1
Crew 1Age 50 · Second Class

Conditions

ConditionsVMC
LightDaylight
Wind320° @ 5 kt
Visibility50 sm
CeilingNone
Temperature / Dew Point0 C
Altimeter0
Weather SourcePILO

Appendix: Source Data