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Weeksville, NC
THE AIRSHIP WAS BEING FLOWN ON A POST MAINTENANCE INSPECTION FLIGHT FOLLOWING AN ANNUAL INSPECTION. AFTER RELEASE FROM THE MOORING TRUCK THE AIRSHIP ROSE ABOUT 150 FEET THEN PITCHED OVER. FULL AFT MOVEMENT OF THE CONTROL YOKE FOR NOSE PITCH UP WAS INEFFECTIVE. THE AIRSHIP THEN COLLIDED WITH THE VEHICLE MOUNTED MOORING MAST WHICH PUNCTURED THE AIR BAG. EXAMINATION OF THE AIRSHIP REVEALED THAT THE ELEVATOR CONTROL CABLES WERE RIGGED BACKWARDS. DURING THE ANNUAL INSPECTION THE ELEVATOR HAD BEEN REMOVED & RE-INSTALLED. THE INSPECTOR WHO SIGNED OFF THE INSPECTION PAPERS DEMONSTRATED, & STATED, THAT HIS INSPECTION PROCEDURE WAS ACCOMPLISHED ALONE. HE PUSHED ON THE ELEVATOR WITH HIS HAND TO CHECK ELEVATOR DEFLECTION. HE DID NOT HAVE A SECOND PERSON ACTIVATE THE COCKPIT CONTROL, TO ENSURE ELEVATOR MOVEMENT IN THE PROPER DIRECTION, AS REQUIRED BY THE MAINTENANCE MANUAL. THE FLIGHT CREW PRE-UNMASTING PROCEDURE REQUIRED THAT A GROUND CREW MAN BE USED TO CONFIRM CORRECT CONTROL SURFACE MOVEMENT.
THE IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF THE ELEVATOR CONTROL CABLES BY REPAIR FACILITY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL, THE INSPECTOR'S INADEQUATE INSPECTION OF THE MAINTENANCE ACCOMPLISHED, AND HIS FAILURE TO FOLLOW DELINEATED PROCEDURES. AN ADDITIONAL CAUSE WAS THE INADEQUATE PREFLIGHT INSPECTION BY THE PILOT IN COMMAND, IN THAT HE FAILED TO CONFIRM CORRECT CONTROL SURFACE MOVEMENT AS REQUIRED BY THE PRE-UNMASTING CHECKLIST.
THE AIRSHIP WAS BEING FLOWN ON A POST MAINTENANCE INSPECTION FLIGHT FOLLOWING AN ANNUAL INSPECTION. AFTER RELEASE FROM THE MOORING TRUCK THE AIRSHIP ROSE ABOUT 150 FEET THEN PITCHED OVER. FULL AFT MOVEMENT OF THE CONTROL YOKE FOR NOSE PITCH UP WAS INEFFECTIVE. THE AIRSHIP THEN COLLIDED WITH THE VEHICLE MOUNTED MOORING MAST WHICH PUNCTURED THE AIR BAG. EXAMINATION OF THE AIRSHIP REVEALED THAT THE ELEVATOR CONTROL CABLES WERE RIGGED BACKWARDS. DURING THE ANNUAL INSPECTION THE ELEVATOR HAD BEEN REMOVED & RE-INSTALLED. THE INSPECTOR WHO SIGNED OFF THE INSPECTION PAPERS DEMONSTRATED, & STATED, THAT HIS INSPECTION PROCEDURE WAS ACCOMPLISHED ALONE. HE PUSHED ON THE ELEVATOR WITH HIS HAND TO CHECK ELEVATOR DEFLECTION. HE DID NOT HAVE A SECOND PERSON ACTIVATE THE COCKPIT CONTROL, TO ENSURE ELEVATOR MOVEMENT IN THE PROPER DIRECTION, AS REQUIRED BY THE MAINTENANCE MANUAL. THE FLIGHT CREW PRE-UNMASTING PROCEDURE REQUIRED THAT A GROUND CREW MAN BE USED TO CONFIRM CORRECT CONTROL SURFACE MOVEMENT.