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Greenville, VA
WHILE IN CRUISE AT 12,000 FEET MSL THE ENGINE LOST TOTAL POWER. THE PILOT MADE A FORCED LANDING ON A FIELD IN GREENVILLE, VA. THE ON SCENE INVESTIGATION REVEALED THE FUEL INJECTOR LINE BETWEEN THE FUEL MANIFOLD AND THE NUMBER 6 CYLINDER FUEL NOZZLE WAS BROKEN. A METALLURGICAL STUDY REVEALED THAT THE SEPARATION OF THE FUEL LINE OCCURRED BY METAL FATIGUE. THE SAFETY BOARD RECOMMENDED TO THE FAA, RECOMMENDATION A-29-10, ON MARCH 2, 1992, THAT AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE (A) BE PUBLISHED ADDRESSING THE FUEL LINE FAILURES. THE FAA ISSUED AN AD (92-12-10), ON JUNE 5, 1992, REQUIRING A VISUAL INSPECTION, WITHIN 10 FLIGHT HOURS, OF EACH FUEL INJECTOR FUEL LINE, AND LOOK FOR MISSING SUPPORT CLAMPS, OR SUPPORT CLAMPS THAT ARE NOT SECURE AND ARE NOT PROPERLY SUPPORTING THE FUEL LINE. THE ACCIDENT AIRPLANE HAD NOT YET ACCRUED 10 FLIGHT HOURS SINCE THE ADOPTION OF THE AD.
THE FATIGUE FAILURE OF THE FUEL INJECTOR FUEL LINE RESULTING IN ENGINE FAILURE. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE UNSUITABLE TERRAIN IN WHICH THE FORCED LANDING WAS MADE.
WHILE IN CRUISE AT 12,000 FEET MSL THE ENGINE LOST TOTAL POWER. THE PILOT MADE A FORCED LANDING ON A FIELD IN GREENVILLE, VA. THE ON SCENE INVESTIGATION REVEALED THE FUEL INJECTOR LINE BETWEEN THE FUEL MANIFOLD AND THE NUMBER 6 CYLINDER FUEL NOZZLE WAS BROKEN. A METALLURGICAL STUDY REVEALED THAT THE SEPARATION OF THE FUEL LINE OCCURRED BY METAL FATIGUE. THE SAFETY BOARD RECOMMENDED TO THE FAA, RECOMMENDATION A-29-10, ON MARCH 2, 1992, THAT AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE (A) BE PUBLISHED ADDRESSING THE FUEL LINE FAILURES. THE FAA ISSUED AN AD (92-12-10), ON JUNE 5, 1992, REQUIRING A VISUAL INSPECTION, WITHIN 10 FLIGHT HOURS, OF EACH FUEL INJECTOR FUEL LINE, AND LOOK FOR MISSING SUPPORT CLAMPS, OR SUPPORT CLAMPS THAT ARE NOT SECURE AND ARE NOT PROPERLY SUPPORTING THE FUEL LINE. THE ACCIDENT AIRPLANE HAD NOT YET ACCRUED 10 FLIGHT HOURS SINCE THE ADOPTION OF THE AD.