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West Columbia, SC
The pilot had stated to friends and other company pilots that the glide slope in the airplane was inoperative. This airplane was operated remotely from the operations and maintenance offices of the company. The pilot had reported to the company, by telephone, that there was a discrepancy with the glide slope. He had not completed the discrepancy form contained in the company manual. The pilot attempted to have the glide slope repaired. The remote maintenance facility was overloaded with work so, the pilot asked his company to intercede with the avionics shop chief to repair N9321Q. Subsequently, no repairs were made to the airplane and the pilot commenced his normal flight schedule. Upon return to the origination airport, an ILS approach was attempted. About one mile from the runway the ATC controller obtained confirmation from the pilot that the airplane was at 1,300 feet. The pilot was asked if a missed approach would be executed, to which he responded no. The accident site was about 1 mile beyond the runway.
THE PILOT'S CONTINUED OPERATION WITH KNOWN DEFICIENT EQUIPMENT, HIS IMPROPER DESCENT, AND HIS FAILURE TO PERFORM A MISSED APPROACH. A FACTOR WAS THE OPERATOR'S INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE OF THE PILOT'S PROCEDURES AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE AIRPLANE.
THE PILOT HAD STATED TO FRIENDS & OTHER COMPANY PILOTS THAT THE GLIDE SLOPE IN THE AIRPLANE WAS INOPERATIVE. THIS AIRPLANE WAS OPERATED REMOTELY FROM THE OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE OFFICES OF THE COMPANY. THE PILOT HAD REPORTED TO THE COMPANY, BY TELEPHONE, THAT THERE WAS A DISCREPANCY WITH THE GLIDE SLOPE. HE HAD NOT COMPLETED THE DISCREPANCY FORM CONTAINED IN THE COMPANY MANUAL. THE PILOT ATTEMPTED TO HAVE THE GLIDE SLOPE REPAIRED. THE REMOTE MAINTENANCE FACILITY WAS OVERLOADED WITH WORK SO, THE PILOT ASKED HIS COMPANY TO INTERCEDE WITH THE AVIONICS SHOP CHIEF TO REPAIR N9321Q. SUBSEQUENTLY, NO REPAIRS WERE MADE TO THE AIRPLANE & THE PILOT COMMENCED HIS NORMAL FLIGHT SCHEDULE. UPON RETURN TO THE ORIGINATION AIRPORT, AN ILS APPROACH WAS ATTEMPTED. ABOUT ONE MILE FROM THE RUNWAY THE ATC CONTROLLER OBTAINED CONFIRMATION FROM THE PILOT THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS AT 1,300 FEET. THE PILOT WAS ASKED IF A MISSED APPROACH WOULD BE EXECUTED, TO WHICH HE RESPONDED NO. THE ACCIDENT SITE WAS ABOUT 1 MILE BEYOND THE RUNWAY.