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Flushing, NY
The B737 was being pushed back using a 2 man ground crew. The tug driver was seated on the left side of the tug. The walker was forward of the tug, on the left side of the airplane, using a 15 ft headset cord which restricted his ability to stay clear of the nosewheel, tug, and towbar. The tug driver said that in his peripheral vision, he saw the walker fall and stopped the tug immediately; however, the tug was not stopped prior to striking the fallen walker who was fatally injured. No witnesses were found who could say why the walker fell. Examination of company procedures revealed they issued a maintenance training bulletin in 12/89. The bulletin referenced a 'requirement' to stay clear of the airplane nosewheel. Although sent to all stations, the bulletin was not mandatory reading and it was not determined if the walker was aware of its content. In addition, the requirements of the bulletin were not implemented into the general maintenance manual.
A LACK OF ADEQUATE CLEARANCE BETWEEN THE WALKER AND TUG WHICH RESULTED IN THE WALKER BEING STRUCK BY THE TUG WHEN HE FELL FOR UNKNOWN REASON(S). A FACTOR RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE LACK OF A POLICY TO STAY CLEAR OF THE TUG, TOWBAR, AND NOSEWHEEL OF THE AIRPLANE, WHILE PUSHBACK OPERATIONS ARE IN MOTION.
THE B737 WAS BEING PUSHED BACK USING A 2 MAN GROUND CREW. THE TUG DRIVER WAS SEATED ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE TUG. THE WALKER WAS FORWARD OF THE TUG, ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE AIRPLANE, USING A 15 FT HEADSET CORD WHICH RESTRICTED HIS ABILITY TO STAY CLEAR OF THE NOSEWHEEL, TUG, AND TOWBAR. THE TUG DRIVER SAID THAT IN HIS PERIPHERAL VISION, HE SAW THE WALKER FALL AND STOPPED THE TUG IMMEDIATELY; HOWEVER, THE TUG WAS NOT STOPPED PRIOR TO STRIKING THE FALLEN WALKER WHO WAS FATALLY INJURED. NO WITNESSES WERE FOUND WHO COULD SAY WHY THE WALKER FELL. EXAMINATION OF COMPANY PROCEDURES REVEALED THEY ISSUED A MAINTENANCE TRAINING BULLETIN IN 12/89. THE BULLETIN REFERENCED A 'REQUIREMENT' TO STAY CLEAR OF THE AIRPLANE NOSEWHEEL. ALTHOUGH SENT TO ALL STATIONS, THE BULLETIN WAS NOT MANDATORY READING AND IT WAS NOT DETERMINED IF THE WALKER WAS AWARE OF ITS CONTENT. IN ADDITION, THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BULLETIN WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED INTO THE GENERAL MAINTENANCE MANUAL.