BFR FLT, THE FLT ENG (F/E) HAD CALCULATED 'V' SPDS & HORIZONTAL STABILIZER TRIM SETTING FOR TAKEOFF, BUT NEITHER THE CAPT NOR THE 1ST OFFICER (F/O) HAD VERIFIED THEM. DRG ROTATION FOR TAKEOFF, THE CAPT NOTED THAT THE FORCED NEEDED TO PULL THE YOKE AFT WAS GREATER THAN NML & THAT THE ACFT WOULD NOT FLY (AT THAT SPD). SUBSEQUENTLY, HE ABORTED THE ATMTD TAKEOFF. REALIZING THE ACFT WOULD NOT STOP ON THE REMAINING RWY, HE ELECTED TO STEER IT TO THE RGT TO AVOID HITTING TFC ON A HWY NR THE DEP END. THE ACFT STRUCK ILS EQUIP; THE LNDG GEAR COLLAPSED & ALL 4 ENGS TORE AWAY. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE ACFT WAS DESTROYED BY FIRE. INV REVEALED THE F/E HAD IMPROPERLY COMPUTED THE TAKEOFF DATA. HE HAD CALCULATED THE 'V' SPDS & HORIZONTAL STABILIZER TRIM SETTING FOR 242,000 LBS; HOWEVER, THE ACTUAL TAKEOFF WT WAS 342,000 LBS. ROTATION SPD (VR) FOR THIS WT WAS 28 KTS ABV THE SPD THAT WAS USED. INV REVEALED SHORTCOMINGS IN THE OPERATOR'S FLIGHTCREW TRAINING PROGRAM & QUESTIONABLE SCHEDULING OF QUALIFIED (BUT MARGINALLY EXPERIENCED) CREW MEMBERS FOR THE ACDNT FLT.