Overall Trends
Total, fatal, and serious accidents in the selected range.
Search investigations, review source evidence, monitor watched reports, and trace long-term patterns from one calm, data-first workspace.
Fast key and full-text search with live filters, watches, and precise metadata.
Use quotes for exact phrase matches (for example "fuel selector valve").
Track fatal and non-fatal accident patterns across Part 91, Part 135, and Part 121 operations.
Major cases, deep-report coverage, and investigation media across decades of NTSB history.
Move quickly by aircraft, airport, operator, and time with indexes built for research, not wandering.
NTSB Reports is an independent research and search tool for public aviation accident and incident records. It brings NTSB aviation reports, structured fields, docket files, extracted figures, photos, videos, and update history into one searchable interface.
The goal is practical safety education: make it faster to find relevant investigations, compare similar events, review factual records, and understand the evidence behind probable-cause and preliminary reports.
The investigative work and source records belong to the National Transportation Safety Board and the published investigation record. This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the NTSB.
Visalia, CA
The certificated airplane transport pilot, the pilot-in-command and instructor pilot, was conducting company training with two captain candidates. The second-in-command, a dual student, was flying from the left seat. The instructor requested a no flap, single engine circling approach, which requires that the landing gear not be extended until a safe landing is assured. The landing gear warning horn did not sound due to the position of the flaps and engine power levers. The student made a checklist call out at a time in the landing sequence that occurs after the landing gear is lowered. Neither pilot recalled calling for the landing gear down. The instructor recalled noting that the student did not call for gear down. He stated that he was giving the student an opportunity to lower the gear without being prompted to do so. The airplane contacted the runway with the landing gear up, causing substantial damage. The three pilots were not injured.
THE INSTRUCTOR/PILOT-IN-COMMAND'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY SUPERVISE THE FLIGHT AND THE SECOND PILOT'S IMPROPER USE OF THE CHECKLIST AND FAILURE TO MAINTAIN CREW COORDINATION TO ENSURE THAT THE LANDING GEAR WAS EXTENDED. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE SILENCING OF THE LANDING GEAR WARNING HORN BY POSITIONING GO THE ENGINE POWER LEVERS.
THE CERTIFICATED AIRPLANE TRANSPORT PILOT, THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND AND INSTRUCTOR PILOT, WAS CONDUCTING COMPANY TRAINING WITH TWO CAPTAIN CANDIDATES. THE SECOND-IN-COMMAND, A DUAL STUDENT, WAS FLYING FROM THE LEFT SEAT. THE INSTRUCTOR REQUESTED A NO FLAP, SINGLE ENGINE CIRCLING APPROACH, WHICH REQUIRES THAT THE LANDING GEAR NOT BE EXTENDED UNTIL A SAFE LANDING IS ASSURED. THE LANDING GEAR WARNING HORN DID NOT SOUND DUE TO THE POSITION OF THE FLAPS AND ENGINE POWER LEVERS. THE STUDENT MADE A CHECKLIST CALL OUT AT A TIME IN THE LANDING SEQUENCE THAT OCCURS AFTER THE LANDING GEAR IS LOWERED. NEITHER PILOT RECALLED CALLING FOR THE LANDING GEAR DOWN. THE INSTRUCTOR RECALLED NOTING THAT THE STUDENT DID NOT CALL FOR GEAR DOWN. HE STATED THAT HE WAS GIVING THE STUDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO LOWER THE GEAR WITHOUT BEING PROMPTED TO DO SO. THE AIRPLANE CONTACTED THE RUNWAY WITH THE LANDING GEAR UP, CAUSING SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE. THE THREE PILOTS WERE NOT INJURED.