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Rio Linda, CA
The pilot had recently finished building the airplane, and it had accrued 16 hours of total time. The pilot said that at one time he had the fuel selector positions placarded but the placards fell off and he never bothered to replace them. While on an extended downwind for landing, the engine stopped running and he landed short of the runway, colliding with a ditch and nosing over. The pilot stated he had just finished switching fuel tank positions when the engine quit running. The engine was successfully run three times during the postaccident investigation. The pilot later said that he thought he had not had the fuel selector properly indexed during the accident flight. Postaccident examination of the fuel selector indicated that the shaft had an improper alignment, which induced excess play in the handle.
Fuel starvation due to the owner/builder's improper installation of the fuel selector valve, and, his failure to placard the operating positions of the valve handle.
On October 2, 1999, at 1145 hours Pacific daylight time, a Zdybel Glasair FT, N711FZ, lost engine power during descent for landing near Rio Linda, California. The airplane sustained substantial damage during the subsequent forced landing when it impacted a ditch and nosed over onto its back. The commercial pilot was not injured. The airplane was owned and constructed by the pilot, and operated under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. No flight plan was filed and visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local area personal flight to practice takeoffs and landings. The flight originated at Rio Linda airport at 1100. According to the pilot, the airplane was newly constructed and flights were restricted to the local area for 40 flight hours. The pilot stated he had 12 gallons of fuel in the left and right tank, respectively, and 8 gallons in the header tank. He estimated he took off about 1100, and planned to fly for approximately 1 hour. He had approximately 16 hours of total time in this airplane. He stated he was coming back into the pattern at an altitude of 800 feet, and setting up for his approach airspeed of 110 knots. He said that there were two other airplanes in the takeoff area so he elected to extend his downwind leg. He said the engine stopped running about 1 mile south of the field. He attempted to land on runway 35 but he landed short of the runway. The pilot told investigators that he had just selected another position on the fuel selector when the engine quit running. At the request of Safety Board investigators, a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness inspector conducted a postaccident examination of the airplane and the Lycoming IO-360-A1B6D engine. After securing the engine and connecting a fuel supply, the engine was started without incident and run briefly on three occasions. The inspector stated that upon further examination of the shaft assembly of the fuel selector, excess movement was found in the fuel selector handle. One end of the fuel selector shaft was out of alignment, which caused excess handle movement before the selector valve body moved. Additionally, the pilot told the inspector that he originally had the placards on the fuel selector but that they fell off and he never replaced them. The inspector stated that the pilot believed he might not have had the fuel selector in the correct position during the accident flight.