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Bastrop, LA
DURING A PREFLT, THE PLT DRAINED THE FUEL SYS/SEDIMENT BOWL UNDER THE ENG COMPARTMENT UNTIL NO WATER CAME OUT. HE NOTED 'QUITE A LOT' OF WATER HAD DRAINED FM THE FUEL SYS. THERE WERE NO FUEL DRAINS UNDER THE WINGS. THE PLT THEN REFUELED THE ACFT, REDRAINED THE FUEL SYS & FND NO MORE WATER. DURING THE INITIAL CLIMB AFTER TAKEOFF, AT ABT 150' AGL, THE ENG LOST POWER. THE PLT WAS ABLE TO LAND ON THE ARPT, BUT NOT ON THE RWY. DURING THE LANDING ROLL, THE ACFT STRUCK 3 STEEL POLES THAT WERE PART OF AN OLD BUILDING. A POST-ACDNT FUEL SAMPLE FROM THE ACFT CONTAINED 1 INCH OF WATER & 3 INCHES OF FUEL. A SAMPLE OF FUEL FM THE STORAGE TANK CONTAINED NO WATER.
LOSS OF ENGINE POWER DUE TO WATER CONTAMINATION IN THE FUEL. A FACTOR RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT WAS: INADEQUATE DESIGN OF THE FUEL SYSTEM DRAINS, WHICH PREVENTED AN ADEQUATE PREFLIGHT OF THE FUEL SYSTEM.
DURING A PREFLT, THE PLT DRAINED THE FUEL SYS/SEDIMENT BOWL UNDER THE ENG COMPARTMENT UNTIL NO WATER CAME OUT. HE NOTED 'QUITE A LOT' OF WATER HAD DRAINED FM THE FUEL SYS. THERE WERE NO FUEL DRAINS UNDER THE WINGS. THE PLT THEN REFUELED THE ACFT, REDRAINED THE FUEL SYS & FND NO MORE WATER. DURING THE INITIAL CLIMB AFTER TAKEOFF, AT ABT 150' AGL, THE ENG LOST POWER. THE PLT WAS ABLE TO LAND ON THE ARPT, BUT NOT ON THE RWY. DURING THE LANDING ROLL, THE ACFT STRUCK 3 STEEL POLES THAT WERE PART OF AN OLD BUILDING. A POST-ACDNT FUEL SAMPLE FROM THE ACFT CONTAINED 1 INCH OF WATER & 3 INCHES OF FUEL. A SAMPLE OF FUEL FM THE STORAGE TANK CONTAINED NO WATER.