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Miami, FL
FLT WAS A 3-ENG FERRY WITH THE #4 ENG SHUT DOWN. DURING TAKEOFF ROLL AT V1 THE #2 ENG OVERHEAT LIGHT CAME ON. ACCORDING TO THE COPILOT THE PILOT REDUCED THROTTLE SLIGHTLY AND CONTINUED THE TAKEOFF. AFTER LIFT-OFF THE PILOT ABORTED THE TAKEOFF. THE AIRPLANE COULD NOT BE STOPPED ON THE REMAINING RUNWAY AND COLLIDED WITH ANTENNAS, APPROACH LIGHTS AND A CONSTRUCTION SITE 1,180 FT FROM THE DEPARTURE END OF THE RUNWAY. POST-CRASH EXAM OF THE 3 OPERATING ENGS DID NOT REVEAL ANY EVIDENCE OF MECHANICAL FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION. A FAILED RESISTOR WAS FOUND IN THE #2 ENG ELECTRONIC ENGINE CONTROL (EEC). THIS WOULD CAUSE THE UNIT TO OVER-SCHEDULE FUEL TO THE ENG RESULTING IN HOTTER ENG OPERATING TEMPERATURES. RETARDING THE THROTTLE WOULD REDUCE FUEL FLOW TO WITHIN NORMAL RANGES FOR ENG OPERATION. UNDER CONDITIONS THAT EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, THE AIRPLANE WOULD HAVE A 3-ENG RATE-OF-CLIMB OF 1,398 FPM, AND A 2-ENG RATE-OF-CLIMB OF 350 FPM.
THE PILOT'S IMPROPER DECISION TO REJECT THE TAKEOFF AFTER THE AIRPLANE HAD PASSED V1 SPEED AND LIFTED OFF THE RUNWAY. A FACTOR WAS A MALFUNCTIONING #2 ENGINE ELECTRONIC ENGINE CONTTROL WHICH CAUSED THE UNIT TO OVER-SCHEDULE FUEL TO THE ENGINE RESULTING IN HOTTER OPERATING TEMPERATURES.
FLT WAS A 3-ENG FERRY WITH THE #4 ENG SHUT DOWN. DURING TAKEOFF ROLL AT V1 THE #2 ENG OVERHEAT LIGHT CAME ON. ACCORDING TO THE COPILOT THE PILOT REDUCED THROTTLE SLIGHTLY AND CONTINUED THE TAKEOFF. AFTER LIFT-OFF THE PILOT ABORTED THE TAKEOFF. THE AIRPLANE COULD NOT BE STOPPED ON THE REMAINING RUNWAY AND COLLIDED WITH ANTENNAS, APPROACH LIGHTS AND A CONSTRUCTION SITE 1,180 FT FROM THE DEPARTURE END OF THE RUNWAY. POST-CRASH EXAM OF THE 3 OPERATING ENGS DID NOT REVEAL ANY EVIDENCE OF MECHANICAL FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION. A FAILED RESISTOR WAS FOUND IN THE #2 ENG ELECTRONIC ENGINE CONTROL (EEC). THIS WOULD CAUSE THE UNIT TO OVER-SCHEDULE FUEL TO THE ENG RESULTING IN HOTTER ENG OPERATING TEMPERATURES. RETARDING THE THROTTLE WOULD REDUCE FUEL FLOW TO WITHIN NORMAL RANGES FOR ENG OPERATION. UNDER CONDITIONS THAT EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, THE AIRPLANE WOULD HAVE A 3-ENG RATE-OF-CLIMB OF 1,398 FPM, AND A 2-ENG RATE-OF-CLIMB OF 350 FPM.