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Cross, SC
THE PILOT HAD COMPLETED ABOUT ONE HOUR OF LOGGING AND WAS EN ROUTE TO THE REFUELING POINT. THE ENGINE QUIT WHEN THE HELICOPTER WAS ABOUT 200 FT OVER A WOODED AREA. WITNESSES OBSERVED THE HELICOPTER IN A NOSE HIGH ATTITUDE, FOLLOWED BY SLOWING OF THE MAIN ROTOR BLADES. ONE WITNESS RECALLED THE HELICOPTER ROTATED ABOUT 180 DEG BEFORE COLLIDING WITH TREES. THE PILOT WAS REMOVED FROM THE HELICOPTER BEFORE IT BURST INTO FLAMES & WAS DESTROYED. BEFORE THE PILOT DIED, HE REPORTED THE FUEL GAGE WAS INDICATING BETWEEN 100 AND 200 LBS BEFORE IT CRASHED. AN EXAM OF THE HELICOPTER FAILED TO REVEAL ANY PREIMPACT MECHANICAL PROBLEMS. THE OPERATING POLICY WAS TO REFUEL WITH 800 POUNDS OF FUEL PLUS 200 POUNDS AS A SAFETY NET. AT 200 FT AGL, A FORWARD SPEED OF OVER 48 MPH WOULD HAVE BEEN NEEDED TO BE OUT OF THE SHADED AREA OF THE HEIGHT-VELOCITY CHART FOR THIS HELICOPTER.
IMPROPER PLANNING/DECISION BY THE PILOT, WHICH RESULTED IN FUEL EXHAUSTION DUE TO AN INADEQUATE SUPPLY OF FUEL, AND HIS FAILURE TO FLY THE HELICOPTER IN SUCH A MANNER THAT WOULD HAVE ASSURED SUFFICIENT ROTOR RPM FOR AN AUTOROTATION.
THE PILOT HAD COMPLETED ABOUT ONE HOUR OF LOGGING AND WAS EN ROUTE TO THE REFUELING POINT. THE ENGINE QUIT WHEN THE HELICOPTER WAS ABOUT 200 FT OVER A WOODED AREA. WITNESSES OBSERVED THE HELICOPTER IN A NOSE HIGH ATTITUDE, FOLLOWED BY SLOWING OF THE MAIN ROTOR BLADES. ONE WITNESS RECALLED THE HELICOPTER ROTATED ABOUT 180 DEG BEFORE COLLIDING WITH TREES. THE PILOT WAS REMOVED FROM THE HELICOPTER BEFORE IT BURST INTO FLAMES & WAS DESTROYED. BEFORE THE PILOT DIED, HE REPORTED THE FUEL GAGE WAS INDICATING BETWEEN 100 AND 200 LBS BEFORE IT CRASHED. AN EXAM OF THE HELICOPTER FAILED TO REVEAL ANY PREIMPACT MECHANICAL PROBLEMS. THE OPERATING POLICY WAS TO REFUEL WITH 800 POUNDS OF FUEL PLUS 200 POUNDS AS A SAFETY NET. AT 200 FT AGL, A FORWARD SPEED OF OVER 48 MPH WOULD HAVE BEEN NEEDED TO BE OUT OF THE SHADED AREA OF THE HEIGHT-VELOCITY CHART FOR THIS HELICOPTER.