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New York, NY
THE FLIGHT CREW WAS UNABLE TO GET A DOWN AND LOCKED INDICATION OF THE NOSE GEAR AFTER SEVERAL ATTEMPTS OF BOTH NORMAL AND EMERGENCY EXTENSION. IN ADDITION, THE NOSE GEAR VIEW WINDOW WAS DIRTY, AND THE CREW WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF THE NOSE GEAR WAS DOWN, AND THEY RECEIVED CONFLICTING GROUND REPORTS ABOUT WHETHER 0R NOT IT WAS DOWN. DURING LANDING, THE NOSE GEAR COLLAPSED. POST INCIDENT INVESTIGATION DISCLOSED A BOGUS PART INSTALLED IN THE NOSE LANDING GEAR DOWN LOCK ACTUATOR WHICH JAMMED, PREVENTING FULL EXTENSION. THE NOSE LANDING GEAR VIEW WINDOW WAS NOT A MAINTENANCE INSPECTION ITEM. INTERVIEWS WITH THE FLT CREW DISCLOSED THEY ATTEMPTED AN EXTENSION FOR TOTAL HYDRAULIC FAILURE AND THEN RESET THE SELECTOR VALVE PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN. WHEN THE VALVE WAS RESET, THE PRESSURE ON THE NOSE LANDING GEAR THAT WAS OBTAINED BY USING THE HAND PUMP WAS RELEASED.
THE FLIGHT CREW'S FAILURE TO FOLLLOW THE LANDING GEAR EMERGENCY CHECKLIST. FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT WERE: A JAMMED NOSE LANDING GEAR DUE TO THE INSTALLATION OF A BOGUS PART BY UNKNOWN PERSON(S) AND A DIRTY GEAR VIEWING WINDOW.
THE FLIGHT CREW WAS UNABLE TO GET A DOWN AND LOCKED INDICATION OF THE NOSE GEAR AFTER SEVERAL ATTEMPTS OF BOTH NORMAL AND EMERGENCY EXTENSION. IN ADDITION, THE NOSE GEAR VIEW WINDOW WAS DIRTY, AND THE CREW WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF THE NOSE GEAR WAS DOWN, AND THEY RECEIVED CONFLICTING GROUND REPORTS ABOUT WHETHER 0R NOT IT WAS DOWN. DURING LANDING, THE NOSE GEAR COLLAPSED. POST INCIDENT INVESTIGATION DISCLOSED A BOGUS PART INSTALLED IN THE NOSE LANDING GEAR DOWN LOCK ACTUATOR WHICH JAMMED, PREVENTING FULL EXTENSION. THE NOSE LANDING GEAR VIEW WINDOW WAS NOT A MAINTENANCE INSPECTION ITEM. INTERVIEWS WITH THE FLT CREW DISCLOSED THEY ATTEMPTED AN EXTENSION FOR TOTAL HYDRAULIC FAILURE AND THEN RESET THE SELECTOR VALVE PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN. WHEN THE VALVE WAS RESET, THE PRESSURE ON THE NOSE LANDING GEAR THAT WAS OBTAINED BY USING THE HAND PUMP WAS RELEASED.