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Gatlinburg, TN
THE TWO PASSENGERS REPORTED THAT THEY HEARD A 'POP' SOUND, FOLLOWED BY THE HELICOPTER STARTING A CLOCKWISE SPIN TO THE RIGHT. THE HELICOPTER DESCENDED INTO THE TREES ON THE SIDE OF A STEEP SLOPE. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE TAIL ROTOR DRIVE SHAFT FAILED IMMEDIATELY FORWARD OF THE TAILBOOM EXTENSION TUBE. THE DRIVE SHAFT FAILED FROM FATIGUE CRACKING, PROPAGATING AT A HIGH RATE, SUGGESTING HIGH LOADS. THE T/R DRIVE SHAFT FORWARD BEARING HOUSING OUTER DIAMETER DIMENSION AND THE INNER DIAMETER OF THE TAILBOOM EXTENSION TUBE WERE WORN BEYOND REPLACEMENT LIMITS AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN REPLACED ACCORDING TO THE BELL MAINTENANCE AND OVERHAUL MANUAL. THE PASSENGER THREE-PLACE BENCH SEAT HAD BEEN ALTERED SO THAT THE INDIVIDUAL SEAT BELTS HAD BEEN MODIFIED INTO ONE SINGLE LONG BELT. THE BELT COULD BE OPENED ONLY ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE BELT; THE BUCKLE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE BELT WAS TAPED CLOSED WITH SILVER DUCT TAPE.
THE ACCIDENT WAS INADEQUATE MAINTENANCE OF THE HELICOPTER, ALLOWING A TAIL ROTOR DRIVE SHAFT BEARING TO EXCEED WEAR LIMITS. THIS RESULTED IN HIGH LOADS ON THE TAIL ROTOR DRIVE SHAFT, AND THE RESULTING FATIGUE FAILURE OF THE DRIVE SHAFT.
THE TWO PASSENGERS REPORTED THAT THEY HEARD A 'POP' SOUND, FOLLOWED BY THE HELICOPTER STARTING A CLOCKWISE SPIN TO THE RIGHT. THE HELICOPTER DESCENDED INTO THE TREES ON THE SIDE OF A STEEP SLOPE. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE TAIL ROTOR DRIVE SHAFT FAILED IMMEDIATELY FORWARD OF THE TAILBOOM EXTENSION TUBE. THE DRIVE SHAFT FAILED FROM FATIGUE CRACKING, PROPAGATING AT A HIGH RATE, SUGGESTING HIGH LOADS. THE T/R DRIVE SHAFT FORWARD BEARING HOUSING OUTER DIAMETER DIMENSION AND THE INNER DIAMETER OF THE TAILBOOM EXTENSION TUBE WERE WORN BEYOND REPLACEMENT LIMITS AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN REPLACED ACCORDING TO THE BELL MAINTENANCE AND OVERHAUL MANUAL. THE PASSENGER THREE-PLACE BENCH SEAT HAD BEEN ALTERED SO THAT THE INDIVIDUAL SEAT BELTS HAD BEEN MODIFIED INTO ONE SINGLE LONG BELT. THE BELT COULD BE OPENED ONLY ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE BELT; THE BUCKLE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE BELT WAS TAPED CLOSED WITH SILVER DUCT TAPE.