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Covington, KY
THE PILOT, A COMPANY CHECK AIRMAN, AND AN FAA INSPECTOR WERE ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT FOR A CHECKRIDE WHICH WAS INTENDED TO REASSESS THE PILOT'S COMPETENCY. A MAINTENANCE TEST (AILERON RIGGING) WAS TO BE PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CHECK RIDE. THE FIRST MANEUVER TO BE PERFORMED WAS A NO-FLAP LANDING. ALL THREE PILOTS STATED THAT THE PILOT HAD DIFFICULTY MANAGING THE AIRCRAFT WHILE IN THE TRAFFIC PATTERN; AIRSPEEDS WERE TOO SLOW, AND THE PILOT WAS CONSTANTLY MANIPULATING POWER. THE PILOT NEVER CALLED FOR THE BEFORE LANDING CHECKLIST, AND THE AIRCRAFT TOUCHED DOWN ON THE RUNWAY WITH THE LANDING GEAR UP. THE CHECK PILOT STATED THAT THE LANDING GEAR WARNING HORN CAME ON BRIEFLY, BUT THE PILOT ADDED POWER AND SILENCED THE HORN. THE FAA INSPECTOR WAS SEATED IN A PASSENGER SEAT FOR TAKEOFF AND LANDING, AND WAS NOT AWARE THAT THE LANDING GEAR WAS NOT EXTENDED.
THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND'S FAILURE TO EXTEND THE LANDING GEAR PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN. CHECKRIDE-INDUCED PRESSURE WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR, AND INADEQUATE SUPERVISION BY THE CHECK PILOT WAS A FACTOR.
THE PILOT, A COMPANY CHECK AIRMAN, AND AN FAA INSPECTOR WERE ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT FOR A CHECKRIDE WHICH WAS INTENDED TO REASSESS THE PILOT'S COMPETENCY. A MAINTENANCE TEST (AILERON RIGGING) WAS TO BE PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CHECK RIDE. THE FIRST MANEUVER TO BE PERFORMED WAS A NO-FLAP LANDING. ALL THREE PILOTS STATED THAT THE PILOT HAD DIFFICULTY MANAGING THE AIRCRAFT WHILE IN THE TRAFFIC PATTERN; AIRSPEEDS WERE TOO SLOW, AND THE PILOT WAS CONSTANTLY MANIPULATING POWER. THE PILOT NEVER CALLED FOR THE BEFORE LANDING CHECKLIST, AND THE AIRCRAFT TOUCHED DOWN ON THE RUNWAY WITH THE LANDING GEAR UP. THE CHECK PILOT STATED THAT THE LANDING GEAR WARNING HORN CAME ON BRIEFLY, BUT THE PILOT ADDED POWER AND SILENCED THE HORN. THE FAA INSPECTOR WAS SEATED IN A PASSENGER SEAT FOR TAKEOFF AND LANDING, AND WAS NOT AWARE THAT THE LANDING GEAR WAS NOT EXTENDED.