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Dallas/Ft Worth, TX
THE FLIGHTCREW REPORTED THAT THE TAKEOFF ROLL APPEARED TO BE NORMAL IN ALL RESPECTS, WITH NO WARNING LIGHTS, AUDIBLE WARNINGS, OR UNUSUAL ENGINE INSTRUMENT CONDITIONS. THE CAPTAIN STATED THAT THE ROTATION WAS INITIALLY NORMAL, BUT AS THE MAIN GEAR WHEELS LEFT THE GROUND HE HEARD 'TWO EXPLOSIONS.' HE SAID IT FELT AS THOUGH THE AIRPLANE WAS EXPERIENCING 'REVERSE THRUST.' THE CAPTAIN STATED THAT THE AIRPLANE BEGAN TO 'ROLL VIOLENTLY.' THE AIRPLANE STRUCK THE INSTRUMENT LANDING SYSTEM (ILS) LOCALIZER ANTENNA ARRAY APPROXIMATELY 1,000 FEET BEYOND THE END OF RUNWAY 18L, AND CAME TO REST ABOUT 3,200 FEET BEYOND THE DEPARTURE END OF THE RUNWAY. INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THAT THE WING FLAPS AND SLATS WERE NOT PROPERLY CONFIGURED PRIOR TO THE ATTEMPTED TAKEOFF. (FOR FURTHER INFORMATION - SEE NTSB/AAR-89/04.)
(1) THE CAPTAIN AND FIRST OFFICER'S INADEQUATE COCKPIT DISCIPLINE WHICH RESULTED IN THE FLIGHTCREW'S ATTEMPT TO TAKEOFF WITHOUT THE WING FLAPS AND SLATS PROPERLY CONFIGURED; AND (2) THE FAILURE OF THE TAKEOFF CONFIGURATION WARNING SYSTEM TO ALERT THE CREW THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS NOT PROPERLY CONFIGURED FOR THE TAKEOFF. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS DELTA'S SLOW IMPLEMENTATION OF NECESSARY MODIFICATIONS TO ITS OPERATING PROCEDURES, MANUAL'S, CHECKLISTS, TRAINING, AND CREW CHECKING PROGRAMS WHICH WERE NECESSITATED BY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE AIRLINE FOLLOWING RAPID GROWTH AND MERGER. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE LACK OF SUFFICIENTLY AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY THE FAA TO HAVE KNOWN DEFICIENCIES CORRECTED BY DELTA AND THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT ACCOUNTABILITY WITHIN THE FAA'S AIR CARRIER INSPECTION PROCESS.
THE FLIGHTCREW REPORTED THAT THE TAKEOFF ROLL APPEARED TO BE NORMAL IN ALL RESPECTS, WITH NO WARNING LIGHTS, AUDIBLE WARNINGS, OR UNUSUAL ENGINE INSTRUMENT CONDITIONS. THE CAPTAIN STATED THAT THE ROTATION WAS INITIALLY NORMAL, BUT AS THE MAIN GEAR WHEELS LEFT THE GROUND HE HEARD 'TWO EXPLOSIONS.' HE SAID IT FELT AS THOUGH THE AIRPLANE WAS EXPERIENCING 'REVERSE THRUST.' THE CAPTAIN STATED THAT THE AIRPLANE BEGAN TO 'ROLL VIOLENTLY.' THE AIRPLANE STRUCK THE INSTRUMENT LANDING SYSTEM (ILS) LOCALIZER ANTENNA ARRAY APPROXIMATELY 1,000 FEET BEYOND THE END OF RUNWAY 18L, AND CAME TO REST ABOUT 3,200 FEET BEYOND THE DEPARTURE END OF THE RUNWAY. INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THAT THE WING FLAPS AND SLATS WERE NOT PROPERLY CONFIGURED PRIOR TO THE ATTEMPTED TAKEOFF. (FOR FURTHER INFORMATION - SEE NTSB/AAR-89/04.)