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Waynesboro, MS
WHILE CRUISING AT 5500 FT, THE PLT SMELLED BURNING OIL. MOMENTS LATER, OIL PRESS WAS LOST, THE PROP WENT INTO HIGH RPM & THE TACH ZOOMED OVER REDLINE. A LOUD REPORT WAS HEARD & ALL POWER WAS LOST. A FORCED LDG WAS ATTEMPTED IN THE ROLLING COUNTRY BUT THE ACFT STRUCK A TREE & FENCE. AN EXAM OF THE ENG REVEALED THE NO. 6 CONNECTING ROD CAP FAILED FOLLOWED BY A PROGRESSIVE AND MASSIVE INTERNAL FAILURE OF THE ENG DUE TO OIL STARVATION. FURTHER EXAM REVEALED THE STARVATION WAS DUE TO A BROKEN OIL SUPPLY HOSE WHICH RUNS FROM THE OIL COOLER TO THE ACCESSORY DRIVE SECTION OF THE ENG. THE HOSE WAS 12 YRS OLD & HAD ACCUMULATED 802 HRS SINCE BEING INSTALLED IN 1978. THE RECOMMENDED REPLACEMENT TIME FOR THE HOSE IS 1000 HRS. THE HOSE IS COVERED BY A FIRE INSULATION SLEEVE & CANNOT BE READILY SEEN WITHOUT DISCONNECTING THE HOSE, REMOVING IT FROM THE ACFT & WITHDRAWING IT FROM THE SLEEVE.
WHILE CRUISING AT 5500 FT, THE PLT SMELLED BURNING OIL. MOMENTS LATER, OIL PRESS WAS LOST, THE PROP WENT INTO HIGH RPM & THE TACH ZOOMED OVER REDLINE. A LOUD REPORT WAS HEARD & ALL POWER WAS LOST. A FORCED LDG WAS ATTEMPTED IN THE ROLLING COUNTRY BUT THE ACFT STRUCK A TREE & FENCE. AN EXAM OF THE ENG REVEALED THE NO. 6 CONNECTING ROD CAP FAILED FOLLOWED BY A PROGRESSIVE AND MASSIVE INTERNAL FAILURE OF THE ENG DUE TO OIL STARVATION. FURTHER EXAM REVEALED THE STARVATION WAS DUE TO A BROKEN OIL SUPPLY HOSE WHICH RUNS FROM THE OIL COOLER TO THE ACCESSORY DRIVE SECTION OF THE ENG. THE HOSE WAS 12 YRS OLD & HAD ACCUMULATED 802 HRS SINCE BEING INSTALLED IN 1978. THE RECOMMENDED REPLACEMENT TIME FOR THE HOSE IS 1000 HRS. THE HOSE IS COVERED BY A FIRE INSULATION SLEEVE & CANNOT BE READILY SEEN WITHOUT DISCONNECTING THE HOSE, REMOVING IT FROM THE ACFT & WITHDRAWING IT FROM THE SLEEVE.