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Hilton Head Is., SC
THE PLT REPORTED THAT THE AIRPLANE LOST POWER SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF. A FORCED LDG WAS SUBSEQUENTLY MADE IN A SWAMP NEAR THE ARPT. THE AIRPLANE NOSED OVER DURING ROLLOUT. POST-CRASH EXAM OF THE AIRPLANE REVEALED THAT THE THROTTLE CABLE OUTER CASING HAD BECOME BRITTLE AND DISINTEGRATED, RESULTING IN A LOSS OF THROTTLE CONTROL. CRACKS WERE VISIBLE ON REMAINING PORTIONS OF THE OUTER CASING. EXAM OF THE ACFT MAINTENANCE LOGBOOKS REVEALED THAT THE ACFT HAD UNDERGONE A 100 HR INSPECTION 2 MONTHS BEFORE THE ACCIDENT. THE ACFT OPERATING TIME SINCE THE INSPECTION WAS ABOUT 47 HRS. FURTHER EXAM OF THE LOGBOOKS REVEALED NO ENTRIES PERTAINING TO THE REMOVAL OR REPLACEMENT OF THE CABLE SINCE THE ACFT WAS NEW. TOTAL TIME ON THE ACFT WAS 3,939 HRS, BASED ON TACH TIME. 14 CFR 43, APPENDIX D REQUIRES THAT ENGINE CONTROLS BE INSPECTED FOR DEFECTS DURING 100 HR INSPECTIONS.
THE PLT REPORTED THAT THE AIRPLANE LOST POWER SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF. A FORCED LDG WAS SUBSEQUENTLY MADE IN A SWAMP NEAR THE ARPT. THE AIRPLANE NOSED OVER DURING ROLLOUT. POST-CRASH EXAM OF THE AIRPLANE REVEALED THAT THE THROTTLE CABLE OUTER CASING HAD BECOME BRITTLE AND DISINTEGRATED, RESULTING IN A LOSS OF THROTTLE CONTROL. CRACKS WERE VISIBLE ON REMAINING PORTIONS OF THE OUTER CASING. EXAM OF THE ACFT MAINTENANCE LOGBOOKS REVEALED THAT THE ACFT HAD UNDERGONE A 100 HR INSPECTION 2 MONTHS BEFORE THE ACCIDENT. THE ACFT OPERATING TIME SINCE THE INSPECTION WAS ABOUT 47 HRS. FURTHER EXAM OF THE LOGBOOKS REVEALED NO ENTRIES PERTAINING TO THE REMOVAL OR REPLACEMENT OF THE CABLE SINCE THE ACFT WAS NEW. TOTAL TIME ON THE ACFT WAS 3,939 HRS, BASED ON TACH TIME. 14 CFR 43, APPENDIX D REQUIRES THAT ENGINE CONTROLS BE INSPECTED FOR DEFECTS DURING 100 HR INSPECTIONS.