Overall Trends
Total, fatal, and serious accidents in the selected range.
Search investigations, review source evidence, monitor watched reports, and trace long-term patterns from one calm, data-first workspace.
Fast key and full-text search with live filters, watches, and precise metadata.
Use quotes for exact phrase matches (for example "fuel selector valve").
Track fatal and non-fatal accident patterns across Part 91, Part 135, and Part 121 operations.
Major cases, deep-report coverage, and investigation media across decades of NTSB history.
Move quickly by aircraft, airport, operator, and time with indexes built for research, not wandering.
NTSB Reports is an independent research and search tool for public aviation accident and incident records. It brings NTSB aviation reports, structured fields, docket files, extracted figures, photos, videos, and update history into one searchable interface.
The goal is practical safety education: make it faster to find relevant investigations, compare similar events, review factual records, and understand the evidence behind probable-cause and preliminary reports.
The investigative work and source records belong to the National Transportation Safety Board and the published investigation record. This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the NTSB.
Tupelo, MS
THE OPERATOR HAD APPLIED FOR AN ON-DEMAND/AIR TAXI CERT, BUT HAD NOT OBTAINED APPROVAL. AFTER LVL-OFF ON A FLT TO CARRY CANCELED CHECKS, THE PLT ELECTED TO USE THE REMAINING FUEL FM THE INBD TANKS. HE STATED THAT SOON THEREAFTER, THE LEFT ENG BGN RUNNING ROUGH, SO HE SELECTED THE OTBD MAIN 'ON THE LEFT SIDE WITH THE BOOST PUMP ON AND NOTHING HAPPENED.' HESAID HE THEN PSND THE L FUEL SELECTOR TO THE INBD TANK & NORMAL ENG OPN RETURNED, MOMENTARILY. AN IDENTICAL SCENARIO OCCURRED ON THE RGT SIDE. AFTER A DUAL PWR LOSS, THE PLT TRIED TO RTRN BACK TO THE DEP ARPT, BUT WAS UNABLE. HE LNDD IN A FIELD, BUT THE ACFT HIT TREES BEFORE STOPPING. AN EXAM OF THE ACFT REVEALED THE INBD TANKS WERE EMPTY, BUT THE OTBD TANKS WERE FULL OF FUEL. THE PSN OF THE FUEL SELECTORS (WHEN THE ENGS LOST POWER) WAS NOT DETERMINED. NO PREIMPACT PART FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION WAS FND. THE FUEL SELECTOR PANEL WAS ON THE FLOOR BTN THE PLT & COPLT SEATS. DUE TO RE-UPHOLSTER-ING OF THE SEATS, THE PLT COULD NOT SEE THE PANEL UNLESS HE PULLED THE SEAT CUSHIONS APART.
THE OPERATOR HAD APPLIED FOR AN ON-DEMAND/AIR TAXI CERT, BUT HAD NOT OBTAINED APPROVAL. AFTER LVL-OFF ON A FLT TO CARRY CANCELED CHECKS, THE PLT ELECTED TO USE THE REMAINING FUEL FM THE INBD TANKS. HE STATED THAT SOON THEREAFTER, THE LEFT ENG BGN RUNNING ROUGH, SO HE SELECTED THE OTBD MAIN 'ON THE LEFT SIDE WITH THE BOOST PUMP ON AND NOTHING HAPPENED.' HESAID HE THEN PSND THE L FUEL SELECTOR TO THE INBD TANK & NORMAL ENG OPN RETURNED, MOMENTARILY. AN IDENTICAL SCENARIO OCCURRED ON THE RGT SIDE. AFTER A DUAL PWR LOSS, THE PLT TRIED TO RTRN BACK TO THE DEP ARPT, BUT WAS UNABLE. HE LNDD IN A FIELD, BUT THE ACFT HIT TREES BEFORE STOPPING. AN EXAM OF THE ACFT REVEALED THE INBD TANKS WERE EMPTY, BUT THE OTBD TANKS WERE FULL OF FUEL. THE PSN OF THE FUEL SELECTORS (WHEN THE ENGS LOST POWER) WAS NOT DETERMINED. NO PREIMPACT PART FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION WAS FND. THE FUEL SELECTOR PANEL WAS ON THE FLOOR BTN THE PLT & COPLT SEATS. DUE TO RE-UPHOLSTER-ING OF THE SEATS, THE PLT COULD NOT SEE THE PANEL UNLESS HE PULLED THE SEAT CUSHIONS APART.