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Binghamton, NY
DRG ARRIVAL, THE CARGO FLT (RELIANT 232) CONTACTED BINGHAMTON APCH CTL & RCVD VECTORS FOR AN ILS RWY 16 APCH. AT THAT TIME, THE ATIS HAD INFORMATION (INFORMATION KILO) THAT THERE WAS LIGHT FREEZING RAIN, THAT ALL PAVED SURFACES HAD A THIN LAYER OF ICE, & THAT BRAKING ACTION WAS POOR. THE COPLT MADE THE APCH & LNDG. THE CAPT RPRTD THAT TOUCHDOWN WAS NORMAL IN THE 1ST 1000' OF THE RWY & THAT THE AIRBRAKE WAS USED, BUT THEY DID NOT KNOW THAT BRAKING ACTION WAS NIL UNTILTHEY WERE ON THE LANDING ROLL. BY THE TIME THEY REALIZED BRAKING WAS NIL, THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT RWY REMAINING FOR A SAFE GO-AROUND. THE CAPT RPRTD HE DEPLOYED THE DRAG CHUTE, BUT A WITNESS WHO SAW THE CHUTE, RPRTD IT DID NOT OPEN. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE ACFT CONTD OFF THE DEP END OF THE 6298 FT RWY, WENT DOWN A STEEP EMBANKMENT & WAS EXTENSIVELY DMGD. THE REQUIRED DISTANCE TO STOP ON AN ICY RWY WAS ESTIMATED TO BE 5344 FT.
IMPROPER PLANNING/DECISION BY THE PILOT(S). FACTORS RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT WERE: ICY RUNWAY CONDITIONS AND FAILURE OF THE DRAG CHUTE TO PROPERLY OPEN AFTER IT WAS DEPLOYED.
DRG ARRIVAL, THE CARGO FLT (RELIANT 232) CONTACTED BINGHAMTON APCH CTL & RCVD VECTORS FOR AN ILS RWY 16 APCH. AT THAT TIME, THE ATIS HAD INFORMATION (INFORMATION KILO) THAT THERE WAS LIGHT FREEZING RAIN, THAT ALL PAVED SURFACES HAD A THIN LAYER OF ICE, & THAT BRAKING ACTION WAS POOR. THE COPLT MADE THE APCH & LNDG. THE CAPT RPRTD THAT TOUCHDOWN WAS NORMAL IN THE 1ST 1000' OF THE RWY & THAT THE AIRBRAKE WAS USED, BUT THEY DID NOT KNOW THAT BRAKING ACTION WAS NIL UNTILTHEY WERE ON THE LANDING ROLL. BY THE TIME THEY REALIZED BRAKING WAS NIL, THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT RWY REMAINING FOR A SAFE GO-AROUND. THE CAPT RPRTD HE DEPLOYED THE DRAG CHUTE, BUT A WITNESS WHO SAW THE CHUTE, RPRTD IT DID NOT OPEN. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE ACFT CONTD OFF THE DEP END OF THE 6298 FT RWY, WENT DOWN A STEEP EMBANKMENT & WAS EXTENSIVELY DMGD. THE REQUIRED DISTANCE TO STOP ON AN ICY RWY WAS ESTIMATED TO BE 5344 FT.