Overall Trends
Total, fatal, and serious accidents in the selected range.
Search investigations, review source evidence, monitor watched reports, and trace long-term patterns from one calm, data-first workspace.
Fast key and full-text search with live filters, watches, and precise metadata.
Use quotes for exact phrase matches (for example "fuel selector valve").
Track fatal and non-fatal accident patterns across Part 91, Part 135, and Part 121 operations.
Major cases, deep-report coverage, and investigation media across decades of NTSB history.
Move quickly by aircraft, airport, operator, and time with indexes built for research, not wandering.
NTSB Reports is an independent research and search tool for public aviation accident and incident records. It brings NTSB aviation reports, structured fields, docket files, extracted figures, photos, videos, and update history into one searchable interface.
The goal is practical safety education: make it faster to find relevant investigations, compare similar events, review factual records, and understand the evidence behind probable-cause and preliminary reports.
The investigative work and source records belong to the National Transportation Safety Board and the published investigation record. This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the NTSB.
Fort Pierce, FL
THE FLT WAS FOR CREW COORDINATION TRAINING & WAS ADMINISTERED BY FLT SAFETY INTL FOR AER LINGUS, A FOREIGN AIRLINE. AN INSTRUCTOR (CFI) & 2 FOREIGN PLTS WERE ABOARD (STUDENTS HAD PREVIOUSLY GOTTEN U.S. CERTS WITH SINGLE/MULTI-ENG RATINGS).BEFORE THE ACDNT, THE ACFT WAS HDG NE. RADAR DATA SHOWED THAT IT TURNED EAST WHILE MAINTAINING A CONSTANT ALT OF 3500'. AFTER TURNING EAST, ITS GND SPD SLOWED TO 53 KTS. THE ACFT THEN BEGAN A RGT TURN AT A RATE OF 125 DEG/MIN. AFTER TURNINGSOUTH, THE ACFT'S GND SPD SLOWED TO 37 KTS. THE ACFT THEN ENTERED A DSCNT, WHICH INCREASED TO 8000'/MIN. WITNESSES SAW THE ACFT SPINNING LEFT, IN A NOSE DWN ATTITUDE, BEFORE IT IMPACTED IN THE OCEAN. NO PREIMPACT PART FAILURE/MALFUNCTION WAS FND. THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT DRG IMPACT, NEITHER ENG WAS OPERG, FLAPS WERE EXTNDD 10 DEG, MAIN GEAR WAS EXTNDD & THENOSE GEAR WAS IN TRANSIT. THE ACFT MANUFACTURER RPRTD THAT A SPIN MAY CAUSE AN INTERRUPTION OF FUEL TO THE ENGS BY EXCEEDING THE CARB LIMITATIONS. INTENTIONAL SPINS WERE PROHIBITED. VMC & STALL SPDS WERE 56 & 54 KTS, RESPECTIVELY.
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION BY THE INSTRUCTOR PILOT (CFI), AND FAILURE OF THE CREW TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT AIRSPEED, WHICH RESULTED IN AN INADVERTENT STALL/SPIN AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF ENGINE POWER FROM POSSIBLE INTERRUPTION OF FUEL.
THE FLT WAS FOR CREW COORDINATION TRAINING & WAS ADMINISTERED BY FLT SAFETY INTL FOR AER LINGUS, A FOREIGN AIRLINE. AN INSTRUCTOR (CFI) & 2 FOREIGN PLTS WERE ABOARD (STUDENTS HAD PREVIOUSLY GOTTEN U.S. CERTS WITH SINGLE/MULTI-ENG RATINGS).BEFORE THE ACDNT, THE ACFT WAS HDG NE. RADAR DATA SHOWED THAT IT TURNED EAST WHILE MAINTAINING A CONSTANT ALT OF 3500'. AFTER TURNING EAST, ITS GND SPD SLOWED TO 53 KTS. THE ACFT THEN BEGAN A RGT TURN AT A RATE OF 125 DEG/MIN. AFTER TURNINGSOUTH, THE ACFT'S GND SPD SLOWED TO 37 KTS. THE ACFT THEN ENTERED A DSCNT, WHICH INCREASED TO 8000'/MIN. WITNESSES SAW THE ACFT SPINNING LEFT, IN A NOSE DWN ATTITUDE, BEFORE IT IMPACTED IN THE OCEAN. NO PREIMPACT PART FAILURE/MALFUNCTION WAS FND. THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT DRG IMPACT, NEITHER ENG WAS OPERG, FLAPS WERE EXTNDD 10 DEG, MAIN GEAR WAS EXTNDD & THENOSE GEAR WAS IN TRANSIT. THE ACFT MANUFACTURER RPRTD THAT A SPIN MAY CAUSE AN INTERRUPTION OF FUEL TO THE ENGS BY EXCEEDING THE CARB LIMITATIONS. INTENTIONAL SPINS WERE PROHIBITED. VMC & STALL SPDS WERE 56 & 54 KTS, RESPECTIVELY.