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Shelby, MS
THE RGT FRONT PAX RPRTD THAT JUST AFTER ROTATION FOR TAKEOFF, THE CABIN DOOR (ON THE RGT SIDE OF THE ACFT) CAME OPEN, CREATING A NOISE. HE STATED THAT HE & THE PLT WERE UNABLE TO CLOSE THE DOOR, SO THE PLT ELECTED TO LAND. RPRTDLY, THE PLT MADE A STEEP RGT TURN WHICH WAS FOLLOWED BY A STEEP LEFT TURN TO MANEUVER BACK TO THE RWY. HOWEVER, THE ACFT ENTEREDA STEEP DESCENT & CRASHED IN A NOSE DOWN, LEFT WING LOW ATTITUDE. NO PREIMPACT PART FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION OF THE ACFT WAS FOUND. THE PAX RPRTD THAT BEFORE THE FLT, HE HAD SHUT THE DOOR, BUT THE PLT DID NOT CHECK TO SEE IF IT WAS LOCKED. ACCORDING TO THE ACFT FLT MANUAL, THE PLT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSURING THE DOOR WAS CLOSED & LOCKED, AND SHOULD THE DOOR COME OPEN IN FLT, HE SHOULD LAND IN A NORMAL MANNER.
FAILURE OF THE PILOT TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE AIRSPEED WHILE MANEUVERING BACK TO THE RUNWAY WHICH RESULTED IN AN INADVERTENTSTALL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: FAILURE OF THE PILOT TO INSURE THE CABIN DOOR (ON THE PASSENGER'S SIDE) WAS PROPERLYCLOSED AND SECURED BEFORE TAKING OFF, THE PILOT'S IMPROPER IN-FLIGHT PLANNING AND DECISION BY MAKING STEEP TURNS TO MANEUVER AND LAND, AND THE PILOT'S ATTENTION BEING DIVERTED BY NOISE FROM THE OPEN DOOR (AURAL PERCEPTION).
THE RGT FRONT PAX RPRTD THAT JUST AFTER ROTATION FOR TAKEOFF, THE CABIN DOOR (ON THE RGT SIDE OF THE ACFT) CAME OPEN, CREATING A NOISE. HE STATED THAT HE & THE PLT WERE UNABLE TO CLOSE THE DOOR, SO THE PLT ELECTED TO LAND. RPRTDLY, THE PLT MADE A STEEP RGT TURN WHICH WAS FOLLOWED BY A STEEP LEFT TURN TO MANEUVER BACK TO THE RWY. HOWEVER, THE ACFT ENTEREDA STEEP DESCENT & CRASHED IN A NOSE DOWN, LEFT WING LOW ATTITUDE. NO PREIMPACT PART FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION OF THE ACFT WAS FOUND. THE PAX RPRTD THAT BEFORE THE FLT, HE HAD SHUT THE DOOR, BUT THE PLT DID NOT CHECK TO SEE IF IT WAS LOCKED. ACCORDING TO THE ACFT FLT MANUAL, THE PLT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSURING THE DOOR WAS CLOSED & LOCKED, AND SHOULD THE DOOR COME OPEN IN FLT, HE SHOULD LAND IN A NORMAL MANNER.