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San Antonio, TX
AFTER THE PILOT WAS CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF, HE ACTIVATED THE STROBE LIGHTS AND TRANSPONDER. APPROXIMATELY 2 TO 5 SECONDS LATER, A MINOR EXPLOSION OCCURRED AND FIRE ENGULFED THE RIGHT WING. THE AIRPLANE HAD A RECENT HISTORY OF FUEL LEAKS IN THE RIGHT WING. A REVIEW OF THE MAINTENANCE RECORDS REVEALED THAT AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE (AD) 74-24-03 HAD NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THE AD STATED, 'TO PRECLUDE POSSIBLE IGNITION OF FLAMMABLE FLUIDS AND VAPORS BY ARCING BETWEEN THE STROBE LIGHT AND AIRCRAFT STRUCTURE, DEACTIVATE THE STROBE LIGHT SYSTEM.' THE OPERATOR'S APPROVED AIRCRAFT INSPECTION PROGRAM (AAIP) DID NOT ADDRESS FUEL SYSTEMS AND RELATED COMPONENTS. THE FAA SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED DIRECTIVES REVISING THE OPERATOR'S AAIP TO INCLUDE ROUTINE INSPECTIONS OF FUEL SYSTEMS AND RELATED COMPONENTS.
A FUEL TANK LEAK, ARCING FROM THE EXTERIOR LIGHTING SYSTEM, AND FAILURE OF COMPANY/MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL TO COMPLY WITH AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE (AD).
AFTER THE PILOT WAS CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF, HE ACTIVATED THE STROBE LIGHTS AND TRANSPONDER. APPROXIMATELY 2 TO 5 SECONDS LATER, A MINOR EXPLOSION OCCURRED AND FIRE ENGULFED THE RIGHT WING. THE AIRPLANE HAD A RECENT HISTORY OF FUEL LEAKS IN THE RIGHT WING. A REVIEW OF THE MAINTENANCE RECORDS REVEALED THAT AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE (AD) 74-24-03 HAD NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THE AD STATED, 'TO PRECLUDE POSSIBLE IGNITION OF FLAMMABLE FLUIDS AND VAPORS BY ARCING BETWEEN THE STROBE LIGHT AND AIRCRAFT STRUCTURE, DEACTIVATE THE STROBE LIGHT SYSTEM.' THE OPERATOR'S APPROVED AIRCRAFT INSPECTION PROGRAM (AAIP) DID NOT ADDRESS FUEL SYSTEMS AND RELATED COMPONENTS. THE FAA SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED DIRECTIVES REVISING THE OPERATOR'S AAIP TO INCLUDE ROUTINE INSPECTIONS OF FUEL SYSTEMS AND RELATED COMPONENTS.