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Tehachapi, CA
AFTER DETERMINING THE TAKEOFF WT OF THE ACFT WOULD BE OVER THE MAX GROSS, THE PLT ASKED THE OPERATOR THE DAY BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO DRAIN 20 GALS OF FUEL FROM THE TANKS.A PLT WHO FLEW THE ACFT PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT FLT SAID HE FLEW FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR AND DID NOT REFUEL THE ACFT DUE TO A BROKEN GAS PIT FUEL PUMP. THE ARPT MGR SAID HE REMOVED 15 GALS FROM THE TANKS THE NIGHT BEFORE THE ACCIDENT FLT, BUT DID NOT LOOK IN THE TANKS PRIOR TO THE DEFUELING. ON THE DAY OF DEPT THE PLT PREFLIGHTED THE ACFT BUT DID NOT USE A DIP STICK TO CHECK THE ACTUAL FUEL QUANTITY. THE PLT SAID WHEN THE ACFT MASTER SWITCH WAS ENERGIZED THE RT FUEL GAUGE READ 'ALMOST EMPTY' AND THE LT GAUGE 'LESS THAN ONE HALF.' THE PLT SAID HE 'ASSUMED THE GAUGES WERE INCORRECT' AND DEPARTED IFR FOR THE DESTINATION. ABOUT 2.8 HRS INTO THE FLT IN IFR CONDITIONS, THE ENGINE QUIT AND THE PLT MADE A FORCED LANDING ON A DIRT ROAD. EXAMINATION OF THE ACFT REVEALED CONTINUITY OF THE FUEL SYSTEM AND NO FUEL IN THE ACFT.
AFTER DETERMINING THE TAKEOFF WT OF THE ACFT WOULD BE OVER THE MAX GROSS, THE PLT ASKED THE OPERATOR THE DAY BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO DRAIN 20 GALS OF FUEL FROM THE TANKS.A PLT WHO FLEW THE ACFT PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT FLT SAID HE FLEW FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR AND DID NOT REFUEL THE ACFT DUE TO A BROKEN GAS PIT FUEL PUMP. THE ARPT MGR SAID HE REMOVED 15 GALS FROM THE TANKS THE NIGHT BEFORE THE ACCIDENT FLT, BUT DID NOT LOOK IN THE TANKS PRIOR TO THE DEFUELING. ON THE DAY OF DEPT THE PLT PREFLIGHTED THE ACFT BUT DID NOT USE A DIP STICK TO CHECK THE ACTUAL FUEL QUANTITY. THE PLT SAID WHEN THE ACFT MASTER SWITCH WAS ENERGIZED THE RT FUEL GAUGE READ 'ALMOST EMPTY' AND THE LT GAUGE 'LESS THAN ONE HALF.' THE PLT SAID HE 'ASSUMED THE GAUGES WERE INCORRECT' AND DEPARTED IFR FOR THE DESTINATION. ABOUT 2.8 HRS INTO THE FLT IN IFR CONDITIONS, THE ENGINE QUIT AND THE PLT MADE A FORCED LANDING ON A DIRT ROAD. EXAMINATION OF THE ACFT REVEALED CONTINUITY OF THE FUEL SYSTEM AND NO FUEL IN THE ACFT.