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Mesa, AZ
FOLLOWING A DURAL ENGINE CHANG, THE PLT TEST FLEW THE ACFT. ON INITIAL CLIMB, AT ABOUT 500 FT AGL, BOTH ENGINES BEGAN BACKFIRING VIOLENTLY & LOST POWER. ACCORDING TO THE PLT, POWER SUFFICIENT FOR FLT COULD NOT BE OBTAINED, & A FORCED LDG WAS MADE ABOUT 0.75 MILES FROM THE ARPT. THE LDG OCCURRED IN OPEN DESERT TERRAIN & THE ACFT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY DAMAGED. THE PLT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE DID NOT CHECK THE POSITION OF THE CONTROL HANDLES FOR THE SUPERCHARGERS DURING EITHER HIS PRE-FLIGHT OR PRE-TAKEOFF INSPECTIONS. AND THE BLOWERS HAD BEEN INADVERTENTLY LEFT SET TO THE HIGH BLOWER POSITION. ACCORDING TO THE PLT, THE CHECKLIST WHICH HE WAS USING FOR THE ACFT DID NOT ADDRESS THE POSITION OF THE BLOWERS BECAUSE FOR THE PAST 15 YRS IT HAD BEEN COMPANY POLICY TO 'WIRE THE BLOWERS TO THE LOW BLOWER POSITION.'
FOLLOWING A DURAL ENGINE CHANG, THE PLT TEST FLEW THE ACFT. ON INITIAL CLIMB, AT ABOUT 500 FT AGL, BOTH ENGINES BEGAN BACKFIRING VIOLENTLY & LOST POWER. ACCORDING TO THE PLT, POWER SUFFICIENT FOR FLT COULD NOT BE OBTAINED, & A FORCED LDG WAS MADE ABOUT 0.75 MILES FROM THE ARPT. THE LDG OCCURRED IN OPEN DESERT TERRAIN & THE ACFT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY DAMAGED. THE PLT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE DID NOT CHECK THE POSITION OF THE CONTROL HANDLES FOR THE SUPERCHARGERS DURING EITHER HIS PRE-FLIGHT OR PRE-TAKEOFF INSPECTIONS. AND THE BLOWERS HAD BEEN INADVERTENTLY LEFT SET TO THE HIGH BLOWER POSITION. ACCORDING TO THE PLT, THE CHECKLIST WHICH HE WAS USING FOR THE ACFT DID NOT ADDRESS THE POSITION OF THE BLOWERS BECAUSE FOR THE PAST 15 YRS IT HAD BEEN COMPANY POLICY TO 'WIRE THE BLOWERS TO THE LOW BLOWER POSITION.'