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Brainerd, MN
DURING ARRIVAL, THE ACFT WAS LANDED ABOUT 1725 FT BEYOND THE RWY THRESHOLD. THE TOUCHDOWN WAS MADE WITH THE RIGHT WING DOWN & THE RIGHT MAIN GEAR ABOUT 37 FT FROM THE RIGHT EDGE OF THE RWY. AFTER TOUCHDOWN, THE ACFT CONTINUED TO THE RIGHT & THE RIGHT PROPELLER STRUCK A 2 TO 3 FT HIGH SNOWBANK WHICH WAS BETWEEN THE EDGE OF THE RWY & THE RWY EDGE LIGHTS. THE #1 BLADE SEPARATED FROM THE PROPELLER & ENTERED THE CABIN, FATALLY INJURING 1 PASSENGER & SERIOUSLY INJURING ANOTHER. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT RWY PLOWING ACTIVITIES, 2 DAYS BEFORE THE ACCIDENT, HAD LEFT SNOWBANKS AT THE EDGE OF THE RWY INSIDE THE RWY EDGE LIGHTS. THEY HAD NOT BEEN REMOVED PER 14 CFR 139.85 & ARPT OPNS MANUAL. THERE WAS NO NOTAM FOR SNOWBANKS & THE COMPANY STATION MANAGER DID NOT NOTIFY THE AIRCREW ABOUT THEIR LOCATION. THE FLTCREW WERE NOT AWARE THAT WHEN THE 1ST OFFICER DIMMED THE INTENSITY OF THE APCH LIGHTS (BY ACTIVATING THE MIC SWITCH) THAT THE RWY EDGE LIGHTS ALSO DIMMED. THE CAPT BELIEVED HE LOST SOME PERIPHERAL CUES AFTER TOUCHDOWN.
DURING ARRIVAL, THE ACFT WAS LANDED ABOUT 1725 FT BEYOND THE RWY THRESHOLD. THE TOUCHDOWN WAS MADE WITH THE RIGHT WING DOWN & THE RIGHT MAIN GEAR ABOUT 37 FT FROM THE RIGHT EDGE OF THE RWY. AFTER TOUCHDOWN, THE ACFT CONTINUED TO THE RIGHT & THE RIGHT PROPELLER STRUCK A 2 TO 3 FT HIGH SNOWBANK WHICH WAS BETWEEN THE EDGE OF THE RWY & THE RWY EDGE LIGHTS. THE #1 BLADE SEPARATED FROM THE PROPELLER & ENTERED THE CABIN, FATALLY INJURING 1 PASSENGER & SERIOUSLY INJURING ANOTHER. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT RWY PLOWING ACTIVITIES, 2 DAYS BEFORE THE ACCIDENT, HAD LEFT SNOWBANKS AT THE EDGE OF THE RWY INSIDE THE RWY EDGE LIGHTS. THEY HAD NOT BEEN REMOVED PER 14 CFR 139.85 & ARPT OPNS MANUAL. THERE WAS NO NOTAM FOR SNOWBANKS & THE COMPANY STATION MANAGER DID NOT NOTIFY THE AIRCREW ABOUT THEIR LOCATION. THE FLTCREW WERE NOT AWARE THAT WHEN THE 1ST OFFICER DIMMED THE INTENSITY OF THE APCH LIGHTS (BY ACTIVATING THE MIC SWITCH) THAT THE RWY EDGE LIGHTS ALSO DIMMED. THE CAPT BELIEVED HE LOST SOME PERIPHERAL CUES AFTER TOUCHDOWN.