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Ft. Myers, FL
DURING TKOF ROLL ABT HALFWAY DOWN THE RWY THE PLT NOTICED THE ACFT WAS NOT ACCELERATING NORMALLY. AFT LIFTOFF HE ATMPTD TO RETURN TO THE ARPT HOWEVER WAS FORCED TO DITCH THE ACFT IN THE CALOOSAHATCHE RIVER DUE TO A LOSS OF PWR. EXAM OF THE ENG REVEALED THAT THE FUEL MANIFOLD HAD NO VALID PART NUMBER AND THAT ITS FUEL DIVIDER BLOCK CONTAINED A BRASS SCREEN THAT WAS ABT 50 PERCENT BLOCKED BY CORROSION PRODUCTS. CONDUCTIVITY TESTS SHOWED THAT ITS ALUMINUM HOUSING WAS NOT ANODIZED FOR ANTI-CORROSION TREATMENT.
DURING TKOF ROLL ABT HALFWAY DOWN THE RWY THE PLT NOTICED THE ACFT WAS NOT ACCELERATING NORMALLY. AFT LIFTOFF HE ATMPTD TO RETURN TO THE ARPT HOWEVER WAS FORCED TO DITCH THE ACFT IN THE CALOOSAHATCHE RIVER DUE TO A LOSS OF PWR. EXAM OF THE ENG REVEALED THAT THE FUEL MANIFOLD HAD NO VALID PART NUMBER AND THAT ITS FUEL DIVIDER BLOCK CONTAINED A BRASS SCREEN THAT WAS ABT 50 PERCENT BLOCKED BY CORROSION PRODUCTS. CONDUCTIVITY TESTS SHOWED THAT ITS ALUMINUM HOUSING WAS NOT ANODIZED FOR ANTI-CORROSION TREATMENT.