On March 16, 2002, about 1240 eastern standard time, a Cirrus Design Corporation SR-20, N244CD, was substantially damaged during an emergency landing in Lexington, Kentucky. The certificated private pilot and a pilot rated passenger sustained minor injuries. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed for the flight that departed the Blue Grass Airport (LEX), Lexington, Kentucky. The personal flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. The instrument rated pilot stated he had intended to perform some practice instrument approaches in actual instrument meteorological conditions. The passenger was a friend of the pilot; and also held a private pilot certificate, with an instrument rating. According to the pilot, after a normal preflight check, the airplane departed from runway 04, at LEX. The pilot maintained runway heading until 1,400 feet, then set the autopilot to fly the "heading bug," and the "VS" to climb. He then initiated a climbing right turn by setting the heading bug to 090 degrees, and entered the overcast layer about 1,600 feet. Air traffic control (ATC) then cleared the airplane to the initial approach fix for the "GPS RW 04" approach. The pilot was in the process of selecting the approach in the airplane's global positioning system (GPS), when he noticed that the turn coordinator was "pegged to the left, with no flag," and that the airplane was losing altitude rapidly. The pilot disengaged the autopilot and attempted to stabilize the airplane. In a written statement, he further added: "...I let [the passenger] know I was disengaging the autopilot. By then we were in a steep dive. At this moment, I had no confidence in the instruments other than airspeed, altimeter and vertical speed indicator. The airspeed was high, perhaps in the yellow arch. When we broke out of the clouds, I pulled up hard and the plane responded. Our momentum carried us back into the clouds and somewhere near 3,000 feet, I had control of the altitude momentarily and thought for a minute we might be able to recover. I tried to fly straight and level, which I believe we did for a short time and then everything started to unravel again. The attitude indicator (AI) was now unreliable. I suspect the AI tumbled during recovery from the previous dive. Next we were climbing and probably turning and generally out of control...." The airplane was equipped with a Cirrus Airplane Parachute System (CAPS). The pilot indicated he pulled the CAPS activation handle repeatedly; however, the cable did not extend and "nothing seemed to happen." He further stated: "...Finally I decided that it must have already deployed, but still we were carrying 120-140 knots of airspeed and descending faster than I expected we would if the chute had deployed. After we broke out [of the cloud layer] we began to search for a suitable landing site. We were still uncertain as to whether or not we were under the canopy, but continued to fly as if we were not..." The airplane touched down in field and struck trees, about 3 miles northeast of LEX. Witnesses near the accident reported that the CAPS parachute deployed after ground contact. With regards to the turn coordinator, the pilot rated passenger stated "... it was banked to the left, and regardless of control inputs, remained in a position indicating a left bank." On site examination of the wreckage by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector did not reveal any pre-impact instrumentation, or autopilot failures; however, the turn coordinator, autopilot control box, autopilot roll trim actuator, and the horizontal situation indicator (HSI) were removed from the airplane for further testing. The CAPS system also functioned normally; however, it was noted that the pull forces to activate the CAPS parachute varied significantly during post accident testing. Additional testing conducted by the manufacturer on production line aircraft revealed that the manner in which the activation handle was pulled, made a difference in how easily the CAPS system could be activated. According to the airplane manufacturer, the CAPS system was designed to bring the aircraft and its occupants safely to the ground in the event of a life-threatening emergency. The CAPS system consisted of a parachute, a solid-propellant rocket to deploy the parachute, a rocket activation handle, and a harness imbedded within the fuselage structure. The activation handle was located in the headliner of the cabin between the forward crew seats. The igniter system employed a 25-pound spring, to arm and trigger the igniter. The pilot was required to pull on the handle, and continue to pull for a short period of time to allow the spring to compress, arm and fire the charge. Yanking the handle in short strokes would not allow the spring to compress completely, and would fail to activate the igniter. On February 25, 2002, Cirrus Design Corporation issued Service Bulletin (SB) 22-95-01. The SB was also the subject of FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2002-05-05, which became effective on March 19, 2002. The service bulletin and subsequent AD, entailed the installation of a cable clamp external to the rocket cone adapter which would provide positive retention of the activation cable housing. On February 28, 2002, Cirrus Design Corporation issued SB 20-95-02, after it was discovered that some production airplanes may exhibit a condition where the pull force required to activate the CAPS system may by greater than desired. The SB entailed the installation of a clamp to positively restrain the cable housing at the CAPS Handle Adapter, loosen and straighten the activation cable above the headliner, and to remove an Adel clamp securing the activation cable adjacent to the rocket cone adapter. The accident airplane was purchased new by the pilot in April 2001, and had been operated for about 150 hours since new. On March 4, 2002, maintenance was performed on the airplane which included compliance with SB 22-95-01/AD 2002-05-05. Service Bulletin 20-95-02, had not been complied with at the time of the accident. The pilot reported he had experienced the exact same type of turn coordinator failure on a previous occasion. Maintenance records revealed a turn coordinator was replaced on the airplane on June 25, 2001, after 57 hours of operation. On April 15, 2002, the retained components from the accident airplane were examined at Meggitt S-Tec, Mineral Wells, Texas, under the supervision of a Safety Board investigator. Functional checks of the components both individually and then as a combined system on an engineering test bench did not revealed any malfunctions. The weather reported at LEX, at 1254, was: wind from 360 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 5 miles in mist, ceiling 600 feet overcast, temperature 6 degrees C, dew point 6 degrees C, altimeter 30.18 in/hg. The pilot reported 371 hours of total flight experience, with 110 hours in make and model. He also reported 54 hours of simulated, and 24 hours of actual flight experience in instrument meteorological conditions. As a result of this accident, and the subsequent testing, Cirrus Design Corporation issued SB 20-95-03, which required replacement of the CAPS handle access cover. The new cover incorporated an expanded description for the CAPS activation handle use. Additionally, on July 10, 2002, SB-20-95-05, was issued and required the replacement of the CAPS activation cable in order to further reduce the pull forces required to deploy the CAPS system. Cirrus Design Corporation also issued similar service bulletins for the SR-22 series airplanes, which were also equipped with a CAPS system.