On June 7, 2002, approximately 2130 mountain daylight time (all times have been converted to mountain daylight time), a Piper PA-24-250 single-engine airplane, N146P, was substantially damaged during a forced landing following a total loss of engine power during takeoff initial climb from the Provo Municipal Airport, Provo, Utah. The instrument-rated private pilot and his passenger were not injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by G & B Investment Management, Portland, Oregon. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a flight plan was not filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The cross-county flight departed the Mesquite Airport (67L), Mesquite, Nevada, approximately 2000, and was destined for Skypark Airport (BTF), Bountiful, Utah, with an intermediate stop at the Provo Municipal Airport. The pilot reported that at 1630, the flight departed BTF for Mesquite to assist in the search and rescue efforts for a missing person. During the flight to Mesquite, the airplane encountered approximately 50 knot headwinds, and the flight time from BTF to Mesquite was 2.5 hours. At 1923 in Mesquite, the pilot topped off both fuel tanks with a total of 33.13 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel. After departure from 67L, the pilot noticed that the cockpit fuel quantity gauges displayed approximately 3/4 rather than full. However, the pilot and passenger had visually verified that the fuel tanks were topped off. On the return flight to BTF, the pilot flew the airplane at 10,000 feet msl. Prior to returning to BTF, the pilot decided to execute a touch and go landing to runway 13 at the Provo Municipal Airport. At 2130, during the climb out after the touch and go landing, the engine "sputtered" and lost total power. The pilot then lowered the landing gear, "pushed the nose over," and attempted to land on the remaining runway. Subsequently, the airplane impacted the terrain, and came to rest upright on the belly of the fuselage off the end of the runway. The firewall and fuselage sustained substantial damage. According to airport personnel, the left fuel tank, when measured with a stick, contained approximately four inches of fuel, the right fuel tank was empty, and the fuel selector was found in the left tank position. No visible fuel was found leaking from the airplane. An FAA inspector, who responded to the accident site the following morning, stated that when the fuel tanks were examined on June 8, 2002, at 0630, both the right and left tanks were dry, and the carbuetor contained "very little fuel." The airplane was then lifted, the landing gear was extended, and the airplane was set down onto the landing gear. Approximately 10 gallons of fuel was added to the left and right fuel tanks, and the engine was test run on the airplane. The engine operated on each fuel tank for 4 minutes and a magneto check was performed, with no anomalies noted. The airplane was recovered to a hangar. On June 10, 2002, the airframe and engine were examined by an A&P mechanic and the FAA inspector. The inspector noted that the fuel tanks contained the fuel that remained from the engine test run that occurred two days earlier. No anomalies were noted with airframe or engine. Airworthiness Directive (AD) 68-13-03 applies to any Piper PA-24, serial number 24-1 through 24-3529. The AD requires the following inspections to be completed: visual inspection of the main fuel cells for indications of fuel cell collapse; visual inspection of the upper and lower fasteners of the main fuel cells which retain the bladder cells to assure security in accordance with Section VIII of Piper Comanche Service Manual No. 753516.; visual inspection of the tank vent tubes under the wing for dirt or ice blockage; inspection of all fuel cell filler caps for secureness and assure installation of proper part number cap; and fuel quantity gauge sending unit check in accordance with Section VIII of Piper Comanche Service Manual No. 753516. Compliance with the AD is required every 100 hours time in service, or until Piper fuel cell vent and drain tube modification kits are installed in accordance with Piper Service Letter No. 516 or a later approved revision. The AD was issued to prevent fuel exhaustion due to fuel cell collapse and loss of fuel through the tank filler caps. A review of the maintenance records by the FAA inspector revealed that the aircraft (serial number 24-366) underwent its last annual inspection on February 5, 2002, at an aircraft total time of 2,122.9 total hours and a tachometer time of 934.35 total hours. The annual inspection logbook entry revealed that AD 68-13-03 was complied with at that time. At the time of the accident, the airplane had accumulated 2,268 total hours, approximately 144 total hours since the last inspection. A review of the AD compliance report revealed that AD 68-13-03 had not been accomplished since the annual inspection. The reason for the loss of engine power during the takeoff climb was not determined.