On September 4, 2003, about 1708 Atlantic standard time, a Britten-Norman BN-2A-27, N630VC, owned and operated by Venagas Construction Corporation, experienced failure of both engines and impacted in an open field during the resultant forced landing, near Cayey, Puerto Rico. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time, and no flight plan was filed. The business flight was conducted under Title 14 CFR Part 91. The airplane was destroyed by postcrash fire. The commercial-rated pilot and one passenger reported minor injuries, and the other four passengers reported no injuries. Two people on the ground reported minor injuries. The flight had originated about 1625 from Isla de Culebra, and was en route to Ponce, Puerto Rico. The pilot stated while on descent from 6,500 feet the airplane's left engine lost power. He secured the left engine, and when he added power to the right engine, he said that he believed it was "not developing full power." He could not maintain altitude, and knew that he would not reach the intended airport. He elected to perform a forced landing in an open field, next to a runner's track. The pilot stated the airplane touched down long and with excessive speed on the field. The pilot took the airplane back into the air to clear trees and power lines separating the field from the runner's track. The airplane struck the trees, power lines and collided with the ground. Everyone on board escaped out moments before the airplane was consumed by postaccident fire. An FAA oversight examination on the left and right engine and propellers were conducted. According to the FAA, both engines were checked for continuity with no defects found. Cylinder compression checks on both engines revealed that they all produced compression except for the number 5 cylinder on the right engine, according to the FAA inspector it was due to impact damage to the push rods. The right propeller did not show evidence of rotation at impact and both blades were found in low pitch. The left propeller was found in the feathered position. A maintenance action entry in the aircraft's maintenance logbook indicate that the wing tip fuel tanks had the drain valve o-rings removed and replaced on the day before the accident. The maintenance entry states wing tip tanks were empty. In an interview with the FAA inspector the pilot stated that he did not utilize the wing tip tanks the morning of the accident, as he normally does. He elected not to fuel either one for the flight, due to the fact that maintenance was performed to the wing tip tanks. The pilot was asked if he selected fuel from the wing tip tanks on the day of the accident? The pilot stated, he was aware of the wing tip tanks being empty and did not select them. Excerpts from Airworthiness Directive (AD) 83-23-1, which is applicable to the accident airplane, states "This is a tip-tanked aircraft. Tip-tanks are to be filled first-used last. Before take-off check both main and tip-tank contents. Take-off and landings are prohibited on main tanks when gauge reads less than three gallons above zero." The mechanic who performed the wing tip tanks maintenance stated "all placards for the operation of the fuel system management were in the airplane cabin in plain view of the pilot." The pilot stated before the fight to Culebra he serviced the airplane with 50 gallons of aviation gasoline, 25 gallons to each main tank, plus the 20 gallons that was already in each main tank making a total of 90 gallons on the airplane for the fight. The pilot went on to state prior to the return flight to Ponce from Culebra he checked his fuel quantity, which indicated he had 35 gallons in each main fuel tank for a total of 70 gallons aboard the airplane before departure. The fight from Ponce to Culebra consumed 20 gallons as per the pilot's statement. Port authority personnel took fuel samples from the facility where the airplane was fueled for the flight on the day of the accident; more so, the FAA took fuel samples as well. FAA inspector statement state both fuel samples showed no contamination.