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Iliamna, AK
The solo commercial certificated pilot was departing from a remote lake in a float-equipped airplane. The pilot reported that this was the first time he had been assigned to fly the accident airplane, and that the airplane's main fuel valve was different than that of any other DHC-2 he had previously flown. Prior to takeoff, he placed the fuel selector valve in the "up" position, believing he had selected the center fuel tank. Just after takeoff, as the airplane climbed to about 30 feet above the water, the engine lost all power, and the airplane descended and struck a gravel-covered road at the departure end of the lake. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot noted that a postaccident inspection of the airplane revealed that when he placed the fuel valve in the "up" position, he inadvertently selected the "off" position. The pilot added that the operator did not inform him of the differences associated with the accident airplane's fuel valve.
The pilot's incorrect selection of the fuel selector valve position during takeoff which resulted in fuel starvation. A factor associated with the accident was inadequate transition training provided to the pilot by the company/operator management.
On June 25, 2003, about 1530 Alaska daylight time, a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 airplane, N930TG, sustained substantial damage when it collided with a gravel-covered road following a loss of engine power on takeoff from a lake located adjacent to the Iliaska Lodge, Iliamna, Alaska. The airplane was being operated by Iliaska Lodge as a visual flight rules (VFR) business flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident occurred. The solo commercial certificated pilot was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a VFR flight plan was in effect. The flight originated at the accident lake, about 1525. During a telephone conversation with a National Transportation Safety Board investigator on August 4, the pilot reported that he was positioning the airplane in order to pick up a group of passengers who were clients of Iliaska Lodge. He said that this was the first time he had been assigned to fly the accident airplane, and that the airplane's main fuel valve was different than that of any other DHC-2 he had previously flown. The pilot stated that prior to takeoff, he placed the fuel selector valve in the "up" position, believing he had selected the center fuel tank. Just after takeoff, as the airplane climbed to about 30 feet above the water, the engine lost all power, and the airplane descended and struck a gravel-covered road at the departure end of the lake. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot noted that a postaccident inspection of the airplane revealed that when he placed the fuel valve in the "up" position, he inadvertently selected the "off" position. The pilot added that the operator did not inform him of the differences associated with the accident airplane's fuel valve.