On October 25, 2003, at 0332 Pacific daylight time, a Piper PA-28R-200, N15192, collided with a power line pole while attempting to land at Whiteman Airport (WHP), Pacoima, California. The pilot, who was also the registered owner, was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The private pilot, the sole occupant, sustained serious injuries; the airplane sustained substantial damage. The flight departed Whiteman about 0230 for the local area personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed. In a written statement, the pilot reported that when he departed Whiteman all of the airport lights were functioning. He then flew over Santa Clarita for approximately 10 minutes. When he was returning, and about 10 miles from Whiteman, he noted that the airport lights were still illuminated. Approximately 1 1/2 miles from the airport, only the taxiway lights were illuminated. He attempted to locate the threshold with his landing light, but was unsuccessful. He added full power, and the airplane impacted a power line pole. The pilot reported that on October 4, 2003, at 0420, he returned to the Whiteman Airport and no lights were visible. There was nothing but "a black void." According to the pilot, no notice to airman (NOTAM) was issued. He circled the airport three times and then the lights illuminated. Whiteman Airport does not have pilot controlled lighting. In an interview with the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC) the airport manager reported that he was not at the airport during the time of the accident. The airport employee did not report any problems with the airport lighting. The manager felt that because the pilot was low at approximately 50 feet above ground level (agl), and about 1 mile from the runway, that he would not have been able to see the airport's lights due to a building obstructing the pilot's view. The building was tall, about 10 to 12 feet from the entry point onto final for runway 12. The pilot impacted the power pole at 50 feet agl. The manager was also interviewed about the airport lighting. He stated that a pilot controlled lighting system had been installed but it was not operational yet. He planned to do so in the near future. If the airport lighting were to malfunction, the procedure was for the airport employees to close the airport, then notify the electrician. This procedure is not written down and was communicated through staff meetings. There had not been any other complaints from pilots regarding the airport lighting. The IIC interviewed the airport employee working the morning of the accident. He stated that he completed an airport inspection nightly, with various patrol operations throughout the evening. Less than 5 minutes prior to the accident time, the employee went into the patrol vehicle. All lights were operating at this time. He drove approximately 100 yards and the lights went out. He is not sure if the runway lights went out, but the overhead lights in his area went out. At the same time he saw a flame in the area of the power lines. The time was around 0330. Soon after, the lights illuminated due to the backup generator. He felt the lights went out when the airplane impacted the power line pole. In the past, the airport employee had not witnessed all of the airport lights going out. He occasionally changed the bulbs. He did report an occasion when the airport beacon was inoperative in May or June. It was repaired soon after. The employee was also charged with monitoring the radio frequency. If there was a problem, he would be the first responder and call emergency personnel for back-up. There was no written procedure for all of the airport lights going out. He assumed that he would notify Burbank. The employee did not have the ability to turn the lights off. The IIC reviewed the nightly inspection reports for Whiteman Airport for October 25, and, additionally, October 4. The reports indicated on October 25, there were three taxi lights that needed to be replaced. The October 4 report indicated two bulbs were out on the precision approach path indicator and the night lights around the runway 30 wind sock were inoperative. Additional lights were inoperative in the fuel storage area and at the apron edge lights near runway 12. Neither report indicated that entire sections of the airport lighting systems were inoperative, nor that the airport lighting system failed completely.