On November 30, 2003, at 1241 eastern standard time (EST), a Cessna 172R, N9968F, was substantially damaged while taxiing at Blue Grass Airport (LEX), Lexington, Kentucky. The certificated flight instructor and the non-certificated student pilot were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local instructional flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. According to a statement submitted by the flight instructor, while taxiing for takeoff, as the airplane passed behind a Canadair CL-600 CRJ, it began to slide sideways, and the left wing struck the ground. The airplane then tipped onto its nose, and pivoted about 180 degrees. As it did so, the instructor shut down the engine. The airplane then came back down on the main landing gear, but continued to "buffet," and began to "fly backwards" in the CRJ's jet blast. A safety representative from the CRJ operator reported that there were two mechanics onboard the airplane to evaluate a cabin smoke discrepancy. While troubleshooting the problem, it was necessary to perform a static engine run at high power for 20-30 minutes. The airplane was chocked, near gate C-5, with the tail pointing north. In addition, there were two employees from an affiliated company in front of the airplane, supervising the operation. A review of air traffic control (ATC) voice recordings revealed that at 1151, one of the mechanics in the CRJ contacted the ground controller, and inquired as to where he could perform a high power engine run-up. The ground controller stated that the mechanic could perform his run-up at the gate and that she would "take the Cessna up to a different intersection." The mechanic then stated that once another airplane in front of his pushed back, he'd advise her that he'd be starting and running the engines. At 1152, the controller stated that if the mechanic didn't want to do the run-up at the gate, he could do it on the other side of the runway. The mechanic replied that he would see how long it took for the other airplane to push back and how long it would take for his company's operations personnel to arrive, and that he'd advise the ground controller at that point as to what he'd be doing. At 1201, the mechanic advised the ground controller that he would perform the run-up at the gate once the airplane in front of him was pushed back. At 1221, a pilot in the airplane in front of the CRJ requested, and was cleared to taxi to the runway. The ground controller also stated, "use caution for that r-j off your right wing doing an engine run up." At 1230, the ground controller began briefing a relieving ground controller. There was no mention of the CRJ engine run-up during the briefing. At 1236, the flight instructor in the Cessna contacted the new ground controller, who cleared him to taxi to the runway. At 1241, the flight instructor advised the new ground controller that he'd need a tow, and shortly thereafter asked, "could you have [the CRJ] redirect his jet blast please?" The controller replied, "we're working on it." One of the employees who was supervising the engine run-up from the outside of the airplane then got the mechanics' attention. The engine run-up was discontinued, and the engines were shut down. According to the safety representative from the CRJ operator, airport police estimated that the Cessna was about 300 feet behind the CRJ when the accident occurred. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Order 7110.65P, Air Traffic Control, Appendix D, Standard Operating Practice for the Transfer of Position Responsibility, stated: "the specialist being relieved shall be responsible for ensuring that any pertinent status information of which he/she is aware is relayed to the relieving specialist...." The weather reported at Lexington, at 1254, included winds from 230 degrees true at 16 knots, 10 miles visibility, no clouds below 12,000 feet, temperature 52 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 32 degrees Fahrenheit, and a barometric pressure of 30.07 inches of mercury.