On December 16, 2003, about 1710 eastern standard time, a Canadair CL-600, N95EB, sustained minor damaged during an overrun at Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey. The two certificated airline transport pilots and unknown number of passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the planned flight to McCarran International Airport, Las Vegas, Nevada. An instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the commercial flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. During the morning hours of December 16, another flightcrew had performed a successful aborted takeoff at TEB. The aborted takeoff was completed in the same airplane, on runway 19; a 7,000-foot long, 150-foot wide, asphalt runway. The captain of that flight stated that he made two attempts to rotate the airplane at 132 knots, but there was no response. The captain aborted the takeoff about 139 knots. The captain further stated that he had flown the same airplane for 4 days prior to the aborted takeoff, and did not experience any problems. The most recent flight was the evening prior to the aborted takeoff, in which the captain flew the airplane from Atlantic City, New Jersey, to TEB. The captain added that the aborted takeoff, and the prior flight, were both conducted as demonstration flights for prospective aircraft buyers. He estimated seven to nine passengers were on each flight, but did not know the exact number as different people were boarding and exiting the airplane at different airports. The captain noted that the only difference between the flight from Atlantic City, and the aborted takeoff at TEB, was the addition of 3,000 to 4,000 pounds of fuel at TEB. The captain stated that before and after the aborted takeoff, he computed a weight and balance using an estimated nine passengers. Both computations resulted in the weight and balance being within the limitations of the airplane. However, when asked to produce the calculations, the captain stated that he did not retain them. After the aborted takeoff, the flightcrew was released for the day, and the airplane underwent a maintenance inspection. The maintenance inspection did not reveal any discrepancies pertaining to inability to rotate the airplane, and the airplane was returned to service later that day. The incident flightcrew was then called for the evening trip, and the incident captain was advised of the earlier aborted takeoff. The incident captain reported that he initiated a takeoff on runway 24; a 6,013-foot long, 150-foot wide, asphalt runway. During the takeoff roll, he was unable to rotate the airplane, and aborted the takeoff. The airplane subsequently traveled approximately 75 feet beyond the end of the runway, and came to rest in mud. After a written request, the incident captain failed to provide a copy or recreation of a weight and balance calculation, or the exact number of passengers on board. When asked why he attempted the takeoff on the shorter runway, the incident captain stated that it was the runway in use at the time. After a written request to the first officer, his attorney reported that the captain completed the weight and balance calculations, and there were six passengers on board. Following the incident takeoff, the airplane underwent a maintenance inspection by the aircraft manufacturer, under the supervision of Federal Aviation Administration inspectors. The inspection did not reveal any discrepancies pertaining to the inability to rotate the airplane. Subsequently, on February 25, 2004, the airplane departed TEB and flew to uneventfully to Windsor Locks, Connecticut. There were no passengers on that flight. The airplane manufacturer computed two weight and balance calculations for the incident takeoff. The first calculation assumed two pilots and six passengers, with 15,070 pounds of fuel. The second calculation assumed two pilots and nine passengers, with 15,070 pounds of fuel. Both calculations revealed the airplane was above the maximum gross takeoff weight, and outside the forward center-of-gravity envelope. A representative from the airplane manufacturer stated that the accelerate stop distance for the airplane was factored into the takeoff distance chart in the airplane flight manual (AFM), and the value was less than the published takeoff distance. Review of a takeoff distance chart for the make and model airplane revealed: at 41 degrees F, at maximum gross weight, with no wind or runway gradient, the airplane would require approximately 5,500 feet of runway for takeoff. The reported weather at TEB, at 1651, was: wind variable at 4 knots; visibility 8 miles; few clouds at 6,000 feet; temperature 41 degrees F; dew point 32 degrees F; altimeter 30.11 inches Hg.