On September 13, 2005, about 1245 eastern daylight time, a parked Sikorsky S-76B, N14CS, operated by ExcelAire Service Inc., was undamaged when a lineman was struck by its turning main rotor at Linden Airport (LDJ), Linden, New Jersey. The lineman was seriously injured, and the certificated airline transport pilot and certificated commercial co-pilot were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight, destined for Westchester County Airport (HPN), White Plains, New York. The pilot and co-pilot each submitted written statements, which contained similar information. The helicopter was taxied to the fixed fuel pump for service, and engine power was reduced to idle. The lineman then arrived, retrieved the aircraft grounding cable, and began pulling it toward the helicopter, approaching from about the 11 o'clock position, as viewed by the pilot. As he proceeded toward the helicopter, the lineman was bent down and was looking at the grounding cable attachment clip. He then suddenly stood upright, was struck by the helicopter's rotor, and knocked to the ground. The crew then shut down the helicopter's engines, stopped the rotor blade, and called for emergency assistance. The weather reported at Newark International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey, about 5 nautical miles northeast, included winds from 190 degrees at 9 knots, 7 statute miles visibility, and few clouds at 4,500 feet. Examination of records from the fueling operator that employed the lineman revealed that he applied for the position of line technician on August 11, 2005. In the blank on the application labeled "Do you have special skills, experience or qualifications related to the position applied for," the lineman wrote "military experience for 8yrs [on] carriers and naval air stations." Several requests were made of the fueling operator to provide the training records and guidance provided to linemen. As of the date of this report, no response has been received. An interview of another lineman revealed that when an employee was hired to be a lineman, they received "on-the-job training" with a senior employee. They were then released to perform refueling operations on their own when the senior employee, or the manager, believed that they were able to perform the job. The employee stated that he had received no formal training, and that there were no records documenting the training that he had received. The employee added that there was no supervisor onsite to oversee refueling operations on a daily basis. The S-76 flight manual states the following with relation to ground operation: "Turning rotors represent considerable hazard to any persons in their vicinity. The best method for prevention of rotor strike incidents are training of flight and ground crew and effective briefing of passengers. Because of well-trained and briefed persons can become preoccupied and helicopter operations may involve areas where access control is limited, special attention must be given to the particular capabilities and characteristics of the S-76 whenever the engines and/or rotors are turning." The manual also gives the following warning: "Some persons may have prior experience with helicopters for which approach from the front is preferred. Approach from the front of an S-76 is not permitted. It is essential that all persons are properly informed regarding the safe approach/departure angles of the S-76." The "Recommended Personnel Exit and Approach" diagram contained in the flight manual depicted a "Danger Area" consisting of the radius of the main rotor from about the pilots 10 o'clock position to the 2 o'clock position.