On December 21, 2008, about 0100 eastern standard time, a Dassault Falcon 20, N165TW, was substantially damaged following a runway excursion after landing on runway 25 at the Chautauqua County/Jamestown Airport (JHW), Jamestown, New York. The airplane was registered to Sierra America Corporation and operated by Ameristar Jet Charter, Inc. The airline transport-rated pilot and commercial-rated co-pilot were not injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 cargo flight. The flight originated at Tulsa International Airport (TUL), Tulsa, Oklahoma at 2200 central standard time. The Director of Operations for Ameristar Jet Charter reported that during the landing roll at JHW, the airplane overran the runway and came to a stop approximately 100 feet into the runway overrun. During the excursion, the nose gear struck a snow berm at the end of the runway. The crew taxied the airplane to the ramp, where damage to the nose landing gear strut was discovered. Subsequent examination of the airplane by Dassault engineering personnel revealed wrinkling of the fuselage skin and a 0.5-inch separation in the nose gear bin assembly. The fuselage was buckled at frames 7 and 8 and the adjacent cargo door latch could not be closed due to fuselage deformation. The operator reported that a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) was issued by JHW for runway 7/25, reporting thin loose snow over patchy thin ice. The NOTAM was in effect at the time of the accident. The captain provided a written statement and was interviewed by the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC). He reported that the co-pilot was flying the approach and landing at JHW. He briefed the co-pilot to land on speed and no longer than the 1,000 foot runway distance marker. The runway appeared normal for the time of year, and the runway surface was visible and not snow-covered. No braking action reports were available to the crew while airborne. The touchdown occurred near the reference speed of 122 knots, about 500 feet down the runway. After touchdown, the co-pilot called out, “I have no brakes, we are sliding, we are sliding.” The captain took control of the airplane, activated the air brakes, and instructed the co-pilot to activate the drag chute. He estimated that the airspeed was “no less than 100 knots” when the drag chute was activated. The airplane continued down the runway and the captain realized the airplane would not stop in the remaining runway distance. He stated that the excursion was not violent, and the nose gear crossed over a snow berm at the end of the runway. He stated that crossing the berm was like “…hitting a bump.” He turned the airplane around and taxied across the berm to the ramp. He described the runway conditions at the time of the accident as “a solid sheet of ice” and braking action was “nil.” He stated that the runway was difficult to stand on. He contacted company operations personnel and instructed them to divert another company aircraft destined for JHW. The co-pilot provided a written statement and was interviewed by the NTSB IIC. He confirmed the account of the captain, adding that the runway was a “sheet of ice.” He reported that the drag chute did not deploy as expected; it was “barely hanging out” of its container. The airplane drag chute was inspected by the operator’s maintenance staff following the accident. The spring-activated extractor cap was found activated and hanging below the tail cone, still attached to the deployment lanyard. The parachute did not deploy and remained 90 percent inside its tail cone container. Further examination did not reveal any anomalies with the parachute or its packing. Maintenance records indicate that the last time the drag chute system was serviced or inspected was during a “2A” inspection on September 6, 2008. Records also indicate that the system was serviced or inspected during a “Z” inspection on August 15, 2007 and during a “C” inspection on August 2, 2005. A review of the Dassault Aviation operating limitations for the Falcon 20 revealed no published minimum speed for drag chute deployment. Documentation provided by Dassault states that the drag chute should be deployed as soon as possible after landing. The JHW airport manager was interviewed after the accident. He reported that N165TW arrived several hours after the airport staff had left for the evening. Prior to the accident, approximately 0400 on December 20, the airport crew arrived and found the runway covered with ice and snow, approximately 0.125 inches deep. Runway friction readings of 23/25/23 MU were observed. For runway friction measuring, the airport utilized a pickup truck with a cab-mounted Tapley decelerometer. The runway was then plowed and sanded over its full length. The airport does not use chemicals to deice the runway. After sanding, a runway friction test was performed and MU readings of 32/26/30 were observed. The airport manager reported that this was the only time on December 20 that the runway was plowed, and it was the last friction test performed that day. On December 20th, sand was also applied to the runway at 1230 and 1430. After the accident, airport staff found the runway “slick, but not ice-covered.” A review of pilot reports (PIREPS) received at JHW on December 20th revealed the following: a private jet pilot reported “fair” braking action at 0615, a Beech 1900 pilot reported “good” braking action at 0635, a Cessna 208 pilot reported “fair to good” braking action at 0915, and a Beech 1900 pilot reported “fair to good” braking action at 1330. Three flights landed at 0920, 1230, and 1335 and their crews did not make a report. The Aeronautical Information Manual addresses runway friction readings. The Greek letter MU is used to designate a friction value representing runway surface conditions. For frozen contaminants on runway surfaces, a MU value of 40 or less is the level when aircraft braking performance starts to deteriorate and directional control begins to be less responsive. No correlation has been established between MU values and the descriptive terms “good,” “fair,” “poor,” and “nil.” The 0055 weather observation for JHW included the following: overcast ceiling at 1,300 feet, surface winds calm, 10 statute miles visibility, temperature 18 degrees Fahrenheit (F), dew point 12 degrees F, and an altimeter setting of 29.68 inches of mercury. A review of hourly weather observations for JHW revealed that no precipitation was recorded at the airport from 0500 on December 20 through 0100 on December 21. From 0100 on December 21 through 0700 on December 21, 0.01 inches of precipitation was recorded at the airport.