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NTSB Report

June 18, 2009 · Airbus A320 · N662AW

Boston, MA

Overview

Report Status
Final with probable cause
Event Type
Incident
Date
June 18, 2009
Injury Outcomes
No injuries (89 uninjured)
Location
Boston, MA
Aircraft
Airbus A320
Tail Number
N662AW
Operator
Usairways
Injuries
None
NTSB Number
OPS09IA008

The airplane rotated approximately 500 feet from the intersection of runway 15R and taxiway M as the vehicle cleared the runway edge southbound on taxiway M. Taxiway M was under construction to connect the northern and southern portions for a full-length parallel taxiway. The operator of the construction vehicle was just coming on shift at the construction site at taxiway M. The Airport Authority had designated the south haul route as active at the time of the incident. The operator of the construction vehicle departed the construction trailer and drove to the construction site via the north haul route. He recalled turning on the construction vehicle’s rotating lights and the radio. He made no radio contact with the tower air traffic controllers during the drive, and despite not seeing any stop signs in place indicating a closed runway or looking both ways at the intersection, crossed the active runway without clearance. The operator of the vehicle stated in his interview he was “on autopilot during the drive to the construction site” and “was preoccupied” with thoughts of what needed to be done at the construction site.

NTSB Probable Cause

The vehicle operator's failure to follow the designated haul route to the construction site and his failure to adhere to airport driving procedures, which led to missed visual cues and lack of required communication prior to crossing the active runway. Contributing to the incident was the vehicle operator's distraction.

Full Narrative

Circumstances of the Incident A construction vehicle crossed runway 15R at taxiway M as an Airbus was on departure roll. The Airbus rotated approximately 500 feet from the intersection of runway 15R and taxiway M as the vehicle cleared the runway edge southbound on taxiway M. The operator of a Ford Explorer (construction vehicle), was just coming on shift at the construction site at taxiway M. Prior to heading to the construction site, the operator of the construction vehicle made radio contact with the engineer in charge of the over-night work. They discussed the runway 4L closure extension, and the overnight engineer’s need for a new radio. Neither contractor recalled any discussion of the active runways or haul route to the construction site. Prior to the incident, the Airport Authority and the construction contractor had jointly established and agreed to follow specific routes to and from the construction site. The two routes established for this project were the “north haul” route and the “south hall” route. Normally only one route is in use at a time. The active route was selected by the Airport Authority based on air traffic needs, weather conditions and construction activities. The south haul route was active at the time of the incident. Once the haul route was established, escort vehicles and others with driving privileges could proceed directly to the construction site without obtaining specific permission from air traffic control (ATC). During runway closures, temporary lighted ‘X’s or stop signs would be placed on each side of the taxiway-runway intersection depicting the runway as not active. However, vehicle operators were still required to “look both ways before crossing any intersection even when the taxiway or runway is not active.” As the operator of the construction vehicle departed for the construction site, he recalled turning on the construction vehicle’s rotating lights and the radio. He drove to the site via the north haul route. He did not verify with airport operations which haul route was in use, and made no radio contact with BOS tower air traffic controllers during the drive. According to FAA, the local tower controller was aware of the vehicle operating on taxiway M, but was unaware of the operator’s intention to cross the active runway without clearance. The operator of the vehicle stated in his interview he was “on autopilot during the drive to the construction site” and “was preoccupied” with thoughts of what needed to be done at the construction site. He also did not recall seeing any stop signs in place before the runway, as he would normally see. Following the incident, the driver was suspended from driving on the airport pending an Airport Authority investigation. Airport and Construction Activity Information General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport (BOS) is located in the East Boston neighborhood of Boston, Massachusetts and covers 2,384 acres. BOS has six asphalt runways: runway 4L/22R is 7,861 ft in length by 150 ft in width; runway 4R/22L is 10,005 ft in length by 150 ft in width; runway 9/27 is 7,000 ft in length by 150 ft in width; runway 14/32 is 5,000 ft in length by 100 ft in width; runway 15L/33R is 2,557 in length by 100 ft in width; and runway 15R/33L is 10,083 ft in length by 150 ft in width. Taxiway M was a partial-length parallel taxiway situated between runway 4L/22R and 4R/22L. At the time of the event, taxiway M was under construction to connect the northern and southern portions for a full-length parallel taxiway. The construction began south of the taxiway M / taxiway Q intersection. This area is located just south of the runway 15R/33L and taxiway M intersection. Construction continued south on taxiway M to just north of the taxiway E / taxiway M intersection where it connected with the existing southern portion of taxiway M. Driver Training According to the Airport Operations Manager at BOS, there are 3 types of licensing for the airfield: Class 1, 2, and 3. Class 1 is issued for driving privileges around the terminal and non-movement areas, Class 2 is issued for driving privileges on the perimeter roads around the movement area (airside), and Class 3 is issued for driving privileges on the movement area (airside). Driver training for a Class 3 license is a 3-step process. Each Class 3 license candidate must successfully complete a computer-based presentation and testing module included in the American Association of Airport Executive’s (AAAE) Interactive Employee Training System. The second step in the process is to complete an airport written test prepared by the Airport Authority and specific to the BOS airfield. Lastly, the candidate must pass a practical driving exam administered by BOS airport operations. The Class 3 license must be renewed on an annual basis, completing each step in the process for each renewal. According to airport driver training records, the operator of the construction vehicle completed each step of the Class 3 licensing process. On January 7, 2009, the operator completed the AAAE’s computer-based training and passed the exam with a perfect score. On February 12, 2009, the operator completed the airport written test and practical driving exam, receiving passing scores on each exam. BOS Air Traffic Control Tower and Massachusetts Port Authority Letter of Agreement During the taxiway M construction project, BOS Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) and the Massachusetts Port Authority (Airport Authority) formulated a Letter of Agreement (LOA) to “reduce frequency congestion and distractions to FAA Tower personnel.” The LOA stated, “construction vehicles that are escorted by a vehicle that is equipped with a two-way radio that is capable of communication with Boston ATCT and operated by a Class 3 driver, are allowed to cross Taxiway N and the northern portion of Taxiway R, without communicating with Boston ATCT.” At the time of the incident, a total of 64 construction-related drivers (from 5 on-going construction projects) held a class 3 driver license, and could serve as an escort or drive on the airfield unescorted. The operator of the construction vehicle held Class 3 driver licenses, and had a two-way radio that was capable of communication with BOS ATCT. As prescribed by the LOA, these drivers could access the taxiway M construction area without communication with BOS ATCT.

Flight

Event TypeIncident
Event Time06:36 EDT
Nearest Airport0nm
Aircraft FireNo

Aircraft

AircraftAirbus A320
Tail NumberN662AW
OperatorUsairways
Operating RulePart 121
Engine TypeTurbofan
Engine DetailsIae · V2500 Series · Turbofan | Iae · V2500 Series · Turbofan

People & Injuries

Injury SummaryNo injuries (89 uninjured)
Fatal0
Serious0
Minor0
Uninjured89
Total89

Conditions

WindCalm
CeilingNone
Temperature / Dew Point0 C / 0 C
Altimeter0

Appendix: Source Data