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Anderson, IN
The pilot reported that he did not identify any anomalies during his before takeoff engine run-up. After the successful engine run-up, he selected 15 degrees of flaps and set the pitch trim for takeoff. After receiving a takeoff clearance he taxied the airplane onto the runway, aligning with the runway centerline with 3,300 feet of runway remaining. Before commencing the takeoff roll, he held the brakes as he increased engine power to achieve maximum takeoff power. The takeoff roll was unremarkable until reaching 90 knots, when he attempted to rotate for liftoff. According to the pilot, aft movement on the control column did not result in the airplane becoming airborne. The pilot decided to abort the takeoff when the airplane had reached 100 knots and had not become airborne after passing the halfway point on the runway. He retarded the engine throttles and applied maximum braking, but the airplane was unable to stop before the end of the runway. The main landing gear collapsed during the overrun, damaging the left wing and fuselage primary structure. A postaccident inspection of the runway revealed heavy tire skid markings, consistent with heavy braking, which began 900 feet from the departure threshold. These heavy tire skid markings continued until the airplane exited the runway surface. The airplane came to rest on its lower fuselage structure, approximately 100 feet west of the extended centerline and about 250 feet from the departure threshold. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Additionally, postaccident inspection did not reveal any anomalies that would have prevented the normal operation of the airplane or its engines. Based on available airport and weather information, the airplane’s pilot operating handbook (POH) indicated that the normal takeoff ground roll at a takeoff weight of 6,400 pounds, without flaps and without a headwind, was about 2,160 feet. The accelerate-stop distance under the same conditions was about 3,600 feet. The POH listed the rotation speed as 115 mph (100 knots) and that normal liftoff was achieved at 120 mph (104 knots). The handbook did not provide performance data for a 15-degree flap takeoff.
Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Airspeed-Not attained/maintained - C
The pilot reported that he did not identify any anomalies during his before takeoff engine run-up. After the successful engine run-up, he selected 15-degrees of flaps and set the pitch trim for takeoff. After receiving a takeoff clearance he taxied the airplane onto the runway, aligning with the runway centerline with 3,300 feet of runway remaining. Before commencing the takeoff roll, he held the brakes as he increased engine power to achieve maximum takeoff power. The takeoff roll was unremarkable until reaching 90 knots when he attempted to rotate for liftoff. According to the pilot, aft movement on the control column did not result in the airplane becoming airborne. The pilot decided to abort the takeoff when the airplane had reached 100 knots and had not become airborne after passing halfway point on the runway. He retarded the engine throttles and applied maximum braking, but the airplane was unable to stop before the end of the runway. The main landing gear collapsed during the overrun, damaging the left wing and fuselage primary structure. A postaccident inspection of the runway revealed heavy tire skid markings, consistent with heavy braking, which began 900 feet from the departure threshold. These heavy tire skid markings continued until the airplane exited the runway surface. The airplane came to rest on its lower fuselage structure, approximately 100 feet west of the extended centerline and about 250 feet from the departure threshold. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Additionally, a postaccident inspection did not reveal any anomalies that would have prevented the normal operation of the airplane or its engines. Based on available airport and weather information, the airplane’s pilot operating handbook (POH) indicated that the normal takeoff ground roll at a takeoff weight of 6,400 pounds, without flaps and without a headwind, was about 2,160 feet. The accelerate-stop distance under the same conditions was about 3,600 feet. The POH listed the rotation speed as 115 mph (100 knots) and that normal liftoff was achieved at 120 mph (104 knots). The handbook did not provide performance data for a 15-degree flap takeoff.