On August 26, 2010, about 1251 Pacific daylight time, an Airbus 320-232, N590JB, experienced an abnormal landing at the Sacramento International Airport (SMF), Sacramento, California. During touchdown and landing rollout on runway 16R, the airplane rapidly decelerated; the main landing gear tires blew out, and a minor tire-related fire erupted. All of the airplane's occupants, emergency evacuated by use of the cabin door slides. The airplane sustained minor damage. The two airline transport pilots, three flight attendants and 79 passengers were not injured. Seven passengers received minor injuries during the evacuation process. The airplane was registered to and operated by JetBlue Airways as flight number 262, under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The scheduled domestic passenger flight originated about 1141 from the Long Beach Airport, Long Beach, California.According to the flight crew, the flight and approach to runway 16R were normal. The first officer was the pilot flying. Upon touchdown, the airplane began a rapid deceleration, and the first officer remarked to the captain that it felt like a main landing gear tire blew out. About this time, air traffic control tower personnel reported observing sparks and smoke in the area of the main landing gear. The captain took control of the airplane and maintained directional control as the airplane came to a stop about 2,000 feet from its touchdown point. The captain directed the first officer to initiate the Quick Reference Checklist (QRC) for ground evacuation, up to the evacuation decision point. At that time, air traffic control tower personnel confirmed smoke and fire were still visible around the main landing gear. Based on this information the captain elected to evacuate the airplane. Crash fire rescue personnel and equipment responded to the airplane, which was stopped on the runway. According to the flight crew and flight attendants, a swift and orderly evacuation was performed via emergency evacuation slides at both the forward main cabin doors and the rear left door. The rear right door was not used since a flight attendant observed smoke in the vicinity. The airplane was subsequently examined by the operator and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) personnel. Airplane damage was limited to four deflated main landing gear tires and the wheel rims were ground down. The main landing gear tires showed evidence of being locked on touchdown. Ground damage was limited to minor grazing of the runway's surface. The airplane's Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) were removed for analysis. The DFDR was examined by the operator and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). According to the airplane's recorded flight data, the parking brake had become engaged in flight during the landing approach at approximately 5,116 feet mean sea level, and remained engaged throughout the remainder of the flight and landing roll. The parking brake activation occurred about the same time the autopilot was disconnected. The downloaded data indicated that the airplane was being configured with speed brakes about 4 seconds prior to the parking brake activation. The first officer stated that he activated the speed brakes. The airplane controls for the speed brake and parking brake are located in the center console in the near vicinity of each other. The speed brake lever is on the left side of the console and is activated by pulling the lever. The parking brake switch is on the bottom center of the console and is activated by pulling and rotating the switch. The CVR was examined by the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Division. The airplane's CVR revealed no sounds of the associated warning audio for the parking brake activation or autopilot disconnect. The CVR did reveal sounds captured around the time of the parking activation, however, the source of the sounds proved to be inconclusive. Non-essential communication existed during the sterile cockpit portion of the descent and approach. During interviews with the flight crew, neither pilot recalled any abnormal indications or cockpit warnings associated with the parking brake system prior to landing. The Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) system is designed to monitor and advise the flight crew of the airplane's status. According to the manufacturer, if the parking brake is engaged in flight, the ECAM illuminates the master caution light, a single chime audio associated with the master caution light is given after a 3 second delay, and a parking brake on advisory message is presented. At 800 feet above ground level (agl), the alerts associated with the parking brake selected on in flight, are reactivated by the ECAM, in the event the alert or master caution was cleared by the flight crew. The applicable hydraulic system also provides an indication that the parking brake was activated in flight by the braking pressure indicators becoming operational. However, normal checklists do not require an in flight check of the brake pressure indicators. The operator performed an examination and functional test of the airplane's parking brake system and central warning systems in accordance with the manufacturer's maintenance manual, with no abnormalities noted. The parking brake control switch was also functionally checked by the operator with no abnormalities noted. A vendor conducted an examination and breakdown of the parking brake control valve and control switch with no abnormalities noted. On a follow up interview, the first officer described his personal technique where he would preempt the autopilot disconnect audio by selecting the ECAM emergency cancel pushbutton prior to disconnecting the autopilot and would hold it for several seconds afterwards. The autopilot disconnect warning audio (cavalry charge) is temporary and last a maximum of 1.5 seconds, if the autopilot is disengaged using standard procedures. Selection of the ECAM emergency cancel pushbutton would terminate the autopilot disconnect audio and any other present caution (master caution lights, ECAM alert message) for the rest of the flight. The alert would appear in the cancelled caution field on the status page and could be recalled if necessary. The operator's procedure has a note to use the ECAM emergency cancel pushbutton only for spurious master cautions. According to the manufacturer, if the ECAM emergency cancel pushbutton is selected prior to the parking brake on alert being displayed; the master caution light and single chime associated with the parking brake on alert would be inhibited. In addition, at 800 feet agl, the "parking brake on" alert message and master caution would not be reactivated. The ECAM emergency cancel pushbutton is not a parameter recorded by the DFDR.