Overall Trends
Total, fatal, and serious accidents in the selected range.
Search investigations, review source evidence, monitor watched reports, and trace long-term patterns from one calm, data-first workspace.
Fast key and full-text search with live filters, watches, and precise metadata.
Use quotes for exact phrase matches (for example "fuel selector valve").
Track fatal and non-fatal accident patterns across Part 91, Part 135, and Part 121 operations.
Major cases, deep-report coverage, and investigation media across decades of NTSB history.
Move quickly by aircraft, airport, operator, and time with indexes built for research, not wandering.
NTSB Reports is an independent research and search tool for public aviation accident and incident records. It brings NTSB aviation reports, structured fields, docket files, extracted figures, photos, videos, and update history into one searchable interface.
The goal is practical safety education: make it faster to find relevant investigations, compare similar events, review factual records, and understand the evidence behind probable-cause and preliminary reports.
The investigative work and source records belong to the National Transportation Safety Board and the published investigation record. This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the NTSB.
Ocoee, FL
The flight crew reported that a "pitch trim miscompare" message illuminated in the cockpit just before they were to level off at 41,000 feet mean sea level (msl). After accomplishing the checklist items and disconnecting the autopilot, the flight crew had to exert considerable forward yoke pressure to maintain level flight. The flight crew found the manual pitch trim control wheel to be "frozen" in the forward position and were unable to move it. They declared an emergency and initiated a descent. Upon reaching 8,000 feet msl, the trim wheel released and the system returned to normal. The airplane landed uneventfully. Maintenance personnel inspected the left and right pitch trim actuators and found that the grease was contaminated with water. The actuators had been inspected and lubricated within the required 1,200-hour interval.
Aircraft-Aircraft systems-Flight control system-Elevator tab control system-Malfunction - C
On December 2, 2011, about 1228 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 560XL, N576CS, landed at Orlando International Airport (MCO), Orlando, Florida, following an in-flight pitch trim malfunction that occurred near Ocoee, Florida. The airline transport-rated pilot and co-pilot were not injured. The airplane was not damaged. The airplane was registered to CitationShares Sales, Inc. and operated by CitationShares Management LLC under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an on-demand air taxi flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight originated at Naples Municipal Airport, Naples, Florida, at 1150 and was destined for Washington Dulles International Airport, Dulles, Virginia. The flight crew reported the following. While approaching their level off altitude of flight level 410, a "Pitch Trim Miscompare" message illuminated in the cockpit. After accomplishing the checklist items and disconnecting the autopilot, considerable forward yoke pressure was required to maintain level flight. The crewmembers found the manual pitch trim control wheel to be "frozen" in the forward position and were unable to move it. The crew declared an emergency and diverted to MCO. During the descent for landing, upon reaching 8,000 feet mean sea level, the trim wheel released and the system returned to normal. The crew cancelled the emergency and landed at MCO uneventfully. After the aircraft was secured, maintenance personnel inspected the flight control system. The grease in the left and right elevator trim actuators was found to be contaminated with water. The trim actuators were replaced and the airplane was returned to service. According to the operator, the elevator trim actuators were last inspected and lubricated 562 hours prior to the incident. The inspection requirement for the actuators was at 2,400 hours initially and at 1,200-hour intervals thereafter.