On August 1, 2014, about 1320 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 172RG, N5276U, was substantially damaged during a forced landing to a marsh following a total loss of engine power near Apalachicola, Florida. The commercial pilot incurred minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local personal flight. The airplane was registered to a corporation and operated by C.A.M.S. Flight School, which was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The flight was originating from Apalachicola Regional Airport-Cleve Randolph Field (AAF), Apalachicola, Florida, at the time of the accident.According to the pilot, he was told that he was going to pick up the airplane since it had come out of maintenance after water was found in the fuel. He performed a preflight, and noted a total of 33 gallons of fuel in the airplane's fuel tanks. The pilot sumped the fuel tanks without any water noted and performed an engine run-up without any anomalies noted. He performed a takeoff and one circuit in the traffic pattern. During the final approach he decided to perform a go-around and applied full power. The airplane began to climb, but soon after, the engine lost total power. He then turned the fuel pump "ON" and applied carburetor heat but the engine did not respond. He repositioned the throttle and then started "pumping it." Then, the engine started, maintained "full" rpm for less than a minute, and then lost total power again. The pilot performed the same procedure of "pumping" the throttle, the engine starting, and then losing total power two more times. After the third loss of total engine power, he elected to perform a forced landing to a marsh area. The airplane impacted the marsh area and came to rest in an upright position. According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the airplane was issued a normal airworthiness certificate in February 1980. It was powered by a Lycoming O&VO 360 series, 180-hp, engine. According to the pilot, the most recent 100-hour inspection was completed on March 17, 2014. At the time of the accident, the tachometer indicated that the airplane had accumulated 7,287 hours of time. A review of recorded data from the AAF automated weather observation station, revealed at 1253 the wind was variable at 4 knots, visibility of 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 28 degrees C, dewpoint 21 degrees C, and a barometric altimeter setting of 30.00 inches of mercury. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the airplane incurred substantial damage to both elevators and horizontal stabilizers. An undetermined amount of fuel was noted in both fuel tanks. The fuel selector valve, located in the cockpit, was noted in "Both" position. The engine remained attached to the fuselage through all engine mounts. One blade of the propeller was bent aft approximately 30 degrees and the other blade was not damaged. The FAA inspector, who responded to the accident, stated that when the wings were removed to facilitate recovery, the left wing tank fuel line to the engine was partially blocked with a sealant type material. The sealant was "fresh" and photographic evidence showed that the sealant was neither weathered nor worn. Upon examining the maintenance records, there was no entry found that indicated when the sealant was applied to the fuel tank. In addition, no paperwork was produced that documented when the maintenance was performed to line the fuel tank with sealant. A postaccident examination of the engine revealed that engine continuity was confirmed from the propeller flange to the accessory section of the engine by rotating the propeller by hand. The fuel screens were removed and no debris was noted. In addition, the engine was started and operated without any anomalies noted. A representative of the manufacturer was contacted and stated that if a fuel line was partially blocked from one fuel tank, as long as the fuel selector valve was on "BOTH," the fuel flow would be sufficient enough to maintain engine power. The carburetor icing probability chart from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB): CE-09-35 Carburetor Icing Prevention, June 30, 2009, showed a probability of serious icing at glide power at the temperature and dew point reported at the time of the accident. In addition it stated that in order to prevent carburetor icing, a pilot should "Use carburetor heat on approach and descent when operating at low power settings, or in conditions where carburetor icing is probable." According to the pilot operating handbook, both the descent and before landing checklist stated that the carburetor heat should be "ON" in order to prevent carburetor icing.