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Little Rock, AR
The airline transport pilot and the copilot were conducting an on-demand, air taxi flight with two passengers on board. The pilot reported that, during the takeoff roll, he heard a "grumble" and that the airplane began shaking. The passengers reported to the flight crew that they saw flames coming out of the right engine. The flight crew then stopped the airplane on the runway and shut down the engines. Postincident examination of the right engine revealed that it had ingested a fuel mat that airplane fuelers had placed on the inboard trailing edge of the wing during preflight fueling and failed to remove after fueling. The pilots reported that they did not conduct an exterior preflight inspection of the airplane after it was fueled and that, during a subsequent visual inspection of the fuel caps, they did not see the fuel mat because of its location on the right wing. The pilots' inadequate inspection of the airplane after it was fueled led to the right engine ingesting the fuel mat during the takeoff roll.
The flight crew's inadequate preflight inspection of the airplane, during which they failed to see a fueling mat that had been placed on the inboard trailing edge of the right wing, which the right engine subsequently ingested during the takeoff roll. Contributing to the incident was the airplane fueler's failure to remove the fuel mat after fueling the airplane.
On January 12, 2016, about 0930 central standard time, a Mitsubishi MU300 airplane, N200LP, experienced an engine fire during the takeoff roll from Bill and Hillary Clinton National Airport/Adams Field (LIT), Little Rock, Arkansas. The two flight crewmembers and two passengers on-board were not injured. The airplane incurred minor damage. The airplane was registered to and operated by Central Flying Service Inc. under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an on-demand air taxi. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The flight was destined for Lake Charles Regional Airport (LCH), Lake Charles, Louisiana. The flight crew reported that the airplane was fueled, and the flight crew completed a walk around inspection of the airplane. After taxiing to runway 18, the flight crew advanced the throttles to takeoff power and began the takeoff roll. A "couple seconds later" the flight crew heard a "grumble" and the airplane began shaking. The passengers in the back of the airplane reported to the flight crew that they saw flames coming out of the of the right engine. The flight crew stopped the airplane and shut down the engines while the airplane was still on the runway. After the airplane was towed off of the runway, the crew noticed the right engine had ingested a fuel mat that was left on the inboard trailing edge of the wing by the airplane fuelers. The fuel mats were placed on the wing after the flight crew's preflight inspection was accomplished, and the flight crew had not noticed the mats during the visual inspection of the fuel caps due to their location on the trailing edge of the wing. To prevent a similar occurrence in the future, the operator implemented a change to the General Operations Manual. Guidance was added to the "Fuel" section, that included: "… After fueling the crew will do a complete inspection of the exterior of the aircraft to ensure wings are clear of foreign objects and damage has not occurred during fueling."