On December 27, 2016, about 1830 central standard time, a Piper PA22-108 airplane, N5499Z, impacted a power line and terrain near Piedmont, Missouri. The private rated pilot was not injured and the airplane was substantially damaged during the accident. The airplane was registered to and operated by a private individual under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time. The pilot reported that he had performed several touch-and-go landings at another airfield, and then returned to the Piedmont Municipal Airport ( KPYN), for additional touch-and-go's. As he approached the runway for the third landing, he added throttle to adjust his glide path; however, the engine did not respond. He added that the engine continued to run, but did not have enough power to maintain altitude. The airplane continued to descend and then the airplane's landing gear caught a power line. The airplane impacted terrain, coming to rest inverted about a half mile short of the runway. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector found that substantial damage was noted to the airplane's fuselage and wings. Fuel was present on site. Further examination of the airplane revealed that control continuity was confirmed to the respective flight and engine controls. When rotated by hand, engine continuity and compression was established on each cylinder. Inspection of the propeller blade tips found they were bent forward; leading edges were gouged and displayed cord wise scoring. No pre-impact abnormalities were noted during the airframe or engine examination. The automated weather observation facility located at the Poplar Bluff Municipal Airport (KPOF) located 29 miles southeast of the accident site recorded at 1753, wind from 170 degrees at 3 knots, 10 miles visibility, a clear sky, temperature 40 degrees Fahrenheit (F), dew point 34 F, and a barometric pressure of 30.25 inches of mercury. The carburetor icing probability chart included in Federal Aviation Administration Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin No. CE-09-35, Carburetor Icing Prevention, indicated that the airplane was operating in an area that was associated with a serious risk of carburetor ice formation at cruise power settings. The pilot stated that he did not use carburetor heat on the approach; adding that the POH (pilot's operating handbook) doesn't call for the use of carburetor heat when at reduced power settings, only at reduced power settings when carburetor icing conditions are present.