On October 24, 2017, about 1540 central daylight time, a Bell 206B helicopter, N60EA, sustained substantial damage during a forced landing after a total loss of engine power while on approach to a private landing zone near Groom, Texas. The pilot was not injured. The helicopter was owned and operated by Plains Aerial Leasing, Inc as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulation Part 137 agricultural aerial application flight. Visual meteorological conditions existed near the accident site at the time of the flight, and a flight plan had not been filed. The flight departed from an off-airport landing zone about 1515. The pilot reported that he had been spraying fields "all day" in the helicopter before the accident occurred. After completing a field, he had the helicopter loaded with chemical and refueled from the helicopter operator's load truck. The pilot did not shut down the helicopter while refueling (commonly known as "hot refueling"). He stated that the fuel gauge indicated that there was 20 gallons of fuel on board when he departed on the accident flight. He flew to a 43-acre field which was about 8 miles away and began spraying. He stated that he flew steep turns while spraying the field. When all the chemical was dispensed onto the field, he made a steep "hard right turn" en route to the operator's base, which was located about 3/4 of a mile west of the field. About 40 seconds after making the hard-right turn and with the fuel gauge indicating 10 gallons of fuel remaining, the helicopter was on approach for landing. While on a right base leg to the landing zone and about 40 ft above ground level with about 35 kts airspeed, the pilot felt the "tail wag," and the engine stopped producing power. He performed an autorotation, but the tail impacted the ground during the flare which resulted in substantial damage to the helicopter. A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector examined the helicopter at the accident site. He examined the engine and there were no apparent anomalies visible. He manually turned the short shaft and the engine turned freely. The P3 line was intact and secure with no visible cracks in the line. The FAA inspector examined the helicopter's fuel system and determined that the fuel quantity and fuel pressure gauges worked properly. The fuel quantity gauge indicated about 7 gallons of fuel remaining. The fuel pressure gauge indicated 2 psi. He drained the airframe fuel filter assembly and 2 spoonsful of fuel were obtained. He turned the fuel boost pumps on, and he stated that the boost pumps initially sounded like they were cavitating. He drained the fuel with the fuel boost pumps running and he obtained about 7 gallons of fuel. The fuel was free of contamination and water. The examination of the helicopter's flight control system exhibited continuity. The breaks in the flight control system were consistent with overload fractures. The engine was removed from the airframe and shipped to a test facility for examination. After a visual examination, it was placed on a test cell. The engine started and completed ground-idle, flight-idle, max-continuous-power and take-off power runs. The engine then completed "wave-off" max-power transients where the power was reduced to flight idle and then rapidly increased to take-off power. The engine responded normally without surging or hesitation. The Bell Helicopter 206B Flight Manual stated that, if installed, the FUEL LOW light would illuminate with approximately 20 gallons of fuel remaining. It stated, "Land as soon as practical." (The accident helicopter did not have the Fuel Low caution light installed. The helicopter's total fuel capacity was 96.7 gallons) The 206B Flight Manual contained this WARNING: "Operation with both fuel boost pumps inoperative is not authorized. Due to possible fuel sloshing in unusual attitudes or out of trim conditions and one or both fuel boost pumps inoperative, the unusable fuel is 10 gallons." The 206B Flight Manual stated this WARNING: "One or both fuel boost pumps is inoperative. Descend to below 6000 feet pressure altitude if flight permits. Land as soon as practical." The NOTE associated with the Warning stated: "The engine will operate without boost pump pressure under 6000 feet pressure altitude and one boost pump will supply sufficient fuel for normal engine operations under all conditions of power and altitude. Both fuel pumps shall be ON for all normal operations." The pilot stated that he pushed the fuel boost pump circuit breakers in when he started the engine before the first flight of the day. He stated that he liked to confirm that the fuel boost pumps were operating when he started the engines. Similarly, he pulled out the circuit breakers when he shut down the helicopter at the end of the day to hear the fuel boost pumps turn off. Although he had refueled throughout the day, he conducted hot refueling between flights and did not shut down the helicopter. He stated that the boost pump circuit breakers were in during the accident flight. He also stated that he will pull the caution light circuit breaker to silence the low rotor rpm warning horn during ground operations. Both boost pump circuit breakers and the caution light circuit breaker had blue collars installed at the end of the circuit breakers which made it easier to identify and pull the circuit breakers. At 1530, the surface weather observation at the Perry Lefors Field Airport (PPA), Pampa, Texas, located about 25 miles to the northeast of the accident site, was; wind 340° at 18 kts, gusting to 27 kts; visibility 10 miles; skies clear; temperature 18° C; dew point -7° C; and altimeter 30.40 inches of mercury.